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A Survey of Public Sector Collective
Bargaining Law In Pennsylvania
John D. Thrush*
I. Introduction
For policemen and firemen in Pennsylvania, 1979 marks the be-
ginning of the second decade of collective bargaining. Collective
bargaining for all other public employees in Pennsylvania is in its
ninth year of development. This article surveys the principles devel-
oped by the courts and the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
(PLRB) under Pennsylvania's public sector collective bargaining
laws-the Collective Bargaining by Policemen and Firemen Act (Act
111)' and the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA).2 Both are
complicated statutes governing the relationship between public em-
ployers and employees, a relationship that can itself become most
complicated.3
II. Preliminaries to Bargaining Under PERA
A. The Appropriate Bargaining Unit
Certain statutory requirements must be complied with before
collective bargaining is required under PERA. These requirements
are intended to establish an appropriate bargaining unit of employ-
ees4 and to determine whether the members of that unit want repre-
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Law Judge, Social Security Administration.
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public sector collective bargaining law that was prepared for the Governor's Study Commis-
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I. Act of June 24, 1968, Pub. L. 237, No. 111, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Pur-
don Supp. 1979).
2. Act of July 23, 1970, Pub. L. 563, No. 195, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ I 101.101-.2301
(Purdon Supp. 1979).
3. This survey article provides a concise overview of the operation of Pennsylvania's
public sector collective bargaining statutes. A more detailed and indepth analysis of particular
points can be found in J. THRUSH, PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS
(1977), and the law review articles noted in the footnotes.
4. An "appropriate bargaining unit" is a unit in which the employees have an identifi-
sentation by a labor organization. Although the parties may be in
agreement regarding the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, it
must be found appropriate by the PLRB in a unit determination
hearing.5
Unit determination hearings are informal proceedings con-
ducted by a hearing examiner. Although characterized as nonadver-
sary, practical considerations enter into the parties' assertions
regarding the propriety of the unit, and it is an important determina-
tion for both the public employer and the labor organization. Gen-
erally, as a matter of strategy, a public employer resisting
unionization will argue that the largest possible unit is the appropri-
ate one because the larger the number of employees, the more diffi-
cult it is for the union to organize.6 Similarly, a union will argue for
a unit in which it is most likely to win an election.
For a number of reasons, unit determinations are rarely ap-
pealed to the courts. Perhaps the most significant reason for not tak-
ing an appeal is the narrow standard of review,7 which recognizes
that unit determinations are difficult to make and that the courts
should defer to the findings of the PLRB in the absence of a clear
showing of arbitrary action by that administrative tribunal.'
able community of interest. The PLRB must also guard against overly fragmented units, how-
ever. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604(l) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
A simplified statement of what constitutes a community of interest is common supervi-
sion, similarity of skills possessed and work performed by the employees, similar working
conditions, wages, fringe benefits, and the integration of work functions directed toward a
common purpose.
Striking a balance between a "community of interest" and "overfragmentation" is a diffi-
cult task, and the resolution will vary with the facts and circumstances of each case. The
PLRB consistently states it need find only an appropriate unit, not the most appropriate. See,
e.g., Lehigh County Commissioners, 7 P.P.E.R. 150, 151 (PLRB 1976); Court of Common
Pleas of Dauphin County, 6 P.P.E.R. 308 (PLRB 1975); West Shore School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R.
200 (PLRB 1975).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.602(a), 1101.604 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See, e.g.,
Loyalsock Twp., 10 P.P.E.R. 1 10054 (PLRB 1979). See also 34 Pa. Code §§ 95.11(b)(3),
95.12(b)(2), 95.13(b)(1), 95.14(3) (1979).
6. This is frequently referred to as a "wall-to-wall" unit. The public employer may also
attempt to include supervisors or employees who it believes would vote against union repre-
sentation in the election. Other considerations must also be taken into account and weighed
by the public employer, for example, the simplicity of dealing with one union rather than
several, and whether the larger unit would be stronger or weaker in bargaining should the
union win the election.
7. The findings of the PLRB are conclusive "if supported by substantial and legally
credible evidence .... ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1502 (Purdon Supp. 1979). An
equally plausible reason is that the parties do not compare their situation with other bargain-
ing units deemed appropriate by the PLRB, and fail to attach sufficient importance to the unit
determination.
8. "[T]he Board ...is considered . better qualified . . . to weigh the facts and to
appreciate the complexities of the subject of labor relations, including the appropriateness of
the proposed bargaining unit." Western Psychiatric Inst. v. PLRB, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 204,
211, 330 A.2d 257, 261 (1974).
B. Statutory Specialized Bargaining Units
PERA requires special bargaining units for certain classes of
employees. Act 111, because of its limited scope, does not set out
such requirements.
1. Professional Employees.-PERA prohibits the inclusion of
professional employees in bargaining units with nonprofessional em-
ployees.9 An important qualification to this rule is that a majority of
professional employees may vote for inclusion in a nonprofessional
bargaining unit.' ° A professional employee is statutorily defined," l
but the application of the definition to individual employees is prob-
lematic. '
2
2. Guards.-PERA also segregates persons employed as
guards protecting the property of public employers or the safety of
persons on the public employer's property. 3 Such employees can
neither be included in a bargaining unit with other public employees
performing different functions nor be represented by a labor organi-
zation that is affiliated with unions representing persons other than
guards.' 4 The practical consideration is obvious-to ensure protec-
tion of the public employer's property during times of labor unrest.
3. Guards at Prisons and Mental Hospitals.--Guards at prisons
and mental hospitals also are placed in bargaining units of their
own, separate and apart from the bargaining units of other guards.' 5
Moreover, they are expressly denied the right to strike accorded
other public employees.6
4. Court Related Employees.-The same statutory provision
that excludes guards at prisons and mental hospitals from bargaining
units of other public employees excludes court related employees
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 1101.301 (7).
12. Whether a person does or does not have a college degree does not conclusively deter-
mine whether that person is a professional employee. Compare York Day Nursery and Kin-
dergarten, 3 P.P.E.R. 101 (PLRB 1973) with Allegheny County, I P.P.E.R. 72 (PLRB 1971).
All of PERA's statutory qualifications must be met, and fitting or not fitting the definition of a
professional employee in other statutes is not conclusive. See Great Valley School Dist., I
P.P.E.R. 13 (PLRB 1971).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
14. Id. School crossing guards, who help protect school children, are not guards protect-
ing personnel and property at the school, and will be included in rank-and-file bargaining
units. Falls Township v. PLRB, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 494, 322 A.2d 412 (1974).
A difficulty encountered is whether persons asserted to be guards are actually policemen
or firemen covered by the Collective Bargaining by Policemen and Fireman Act of June 24,
1968, Pub. L. 237, No. 11l, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See
notes 25-27 and accompanying text infra.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
16. Id. § I01.1001.
from bargaining units of other public employees.' 7 As with guards
at prisons and mental hospitals, PERA expressly denies court related
employees the right to strike.'8
The problem of who was the employer of court related employ-
ees for purposes of negotiating collective bargaining agreements was
a much litigated point under PERA. Initially, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ruled that persons working for judges should be re-
garded as being employed jointly by the courts, which controlled the
employees' activities, and by the county commissioners, who paid
the employees' salaries.' 9 When next presented with the issue of
who was the employer of employees working in "row offices" or for
the courts, but paid out of county funds, the court upheld an amend-
ment to the County Code that granted county commissioners "the
sole power and responsibility to represent judges of the courts of
common pleas" 20 against constitutional challenges.2' Thus, joint
representation of managerial representatives in PLRB proceedings
and collective bargaining negotiations involving court related em-
ployees is no longer necessary.
5. First Level Sufpervisors.-PERA requires the exclusion of
first level supervisors from rank-and-file bargaining units and inclu-
sion of first level supervisors in "meet and discuss" units.22 PERA
thus does not grant first level supervisors the right to bargain collec-
tively, but only the right to "meet and discuss," which differs sub-
stantially from collective bargaining.
23
6. Policemen and Firemen.-Both policemen and firemen are
covered by Act 111,24 and hence, may not be included in bargaining
units with employees covered by PERA.25 Conversely, public em-
ployees covered by PERA may not be included in bargaining units
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
18. Id. § i101.1001.
19. See Costigan v. Local 696, AFSCME, 462 Pa. 425, 341 A.2d 456 (1975); Sweet v.
PLRB, 457 Pa. 456, 322 A.2d 362 (1974).
20. The County Code, Act of August 9, 1955, Pub. L. 323, as amendedby Act of June 29,
1976, Pub. L. 460, 115, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1620 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Although this
statute applies only to counties of the third through eighth classes, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held the amendment applicable to Allegheny County. Ellenbogen v. County of Alle-
gheny, 479 Pa. 429, 435-36, 388 A.2d 730, 733-34 (1978).
21. Board of Judges, Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County v. Bucks County
Comm'rs, 479 Pa. 457, 388 A.2d 743 (1978); Sweet v. PLRB, 479 Pa. 449, 388 A.2d 740 (1978);
Commonwealth ex rel. Bradley v. PLRB, 479 Pa. 441, 388 A.2d 736 (1978); Ellenbogen v.
County of Allegheny, 479 Pa. 429, 388 A.2d 730 (1978).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.704 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See also notes 29-35 and
accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 138-150 and accompanying text infra.
24. The Collective Bargaining by Policemen and Fireman Act of June 24, 1968, Pub. L.
237, No. 11, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
25. The Public Employe Relations Act of July 23, 1970, Pub. L. 563, No. 195, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
of policemen and firemen. Because Act I l l does not define "police-
men" or "firemen," a determination of whether particular employees
come under the coverage of PERA or Act 11 1 is determined on a
case by case basis.26 The PLRB may be resolving doubts in favor of
a finding that the employees are policemen or firemen covered by
Act 111 in order to ensure that the legislative prohibition on strikes
by employees providing police and fire protection is not frustrated.27
C. Exclusions From Bargaining Units
In addition to the categories of employees discussed above,
which must be placed in specialized collective bargaining units, vari-
ous other employees, whether by statute or by court or PLRB deci-
sion, must be excluded from bargaining units. These employees,
with the exception of supervisors, are accorded neither the right to
bargain collectively nor the right to "meet and discuss. "28
1. Supervisors. -Supervisors are not included in collective
bargaining units of rank-and-file employees under PERA.29  The
definition of supervisor in PERA is taken almost word for word from
the federal Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.30 An impor-
tant difference, which adds a somewhat new dimension to the defini-
tion of supervisor, is that under PERA a supervisor need not have
authority to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge
or discipline employees if he can "to a substantial degree effectively
recommend such action."' I This qualification seems particularly ap-
propriate when one recognizes that supervisory employees in the
public sector rarely have control over hiring, firing, or promoting
employees.32
26. It is clear that the mere use of the title "policeman" or "fireman" is not controlling.
See Venneri v. County of Allegheny, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 517, 316 A.2d 120 (1974); Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, 3 P.P.E.R. 57 and 3 P.P.E.R. 60 (PLRB 1973). Two relevant factors to
consider are the responsibility to keep peace in the community, see Township of Falls v.
PLRB, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 494, 322 A.2d 412 (1974); and the power of arrest as a primary
responsibility. Hartshorn v. County of Allegheny, 460 Pa. 560, 333 A.2d 914 (1975); cf Ven-
neri v. County of Allegheny, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 517, 316 A.2d 120 (1974) (arrest power not
primary responsibility).
27. See, e.g., Philadelphia Housing Authority, 9 P.P.E.R. 9256 (PLRB 1978). See also
Bucks County Park Rangers, 9 P.P.E.R. 9292 (C.P. Bucks 1978).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
29. See note 22 supra.
30. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(6) (Pur-
don Supp. 1979).
31. Id.
32. One court concluded that the legislature inserted this phrase to make clear that the
recommendations of supervisors need not have "controlling weight." In re Employees of Ber-
mudian Springs School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 79 (C.P. Adams 1975). The PLRB decisions are in-
consistent. Compare Bellefonte Area School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 60 (PLRB 1973) with Altoona
Area School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 97 (PLRB 1973).
The rule under federal private sector labor law is that a supervisor's power effectively to
recommend, for example, a discharge must be controlling. See Risdon Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B.
579, 581 (1972). As noted, however, there is a significant difference between the language of
The PLRB cases attempting to apply the definition of supervisor
in particular factual situations are legion. One fairly well-estab-
lished principle that emerges is that the PLRB will neither set quan-
titative standards for the determination of supervisory status33 nor
police the job descriptions of the public employer. 34  Nevertheless,
the public employer cannot preclude collective bargaining by plac-
ing employees in job classifications that indicate supervisory status
and power if the employees do not in fact perform supervisory du-
ties.35
Act I 11, covering policemen and firemen, contains no definition
of supervisor. Moreover, it does not state whether supervisors
should be included with rank-and-file policemen and firemen, be set
up in separate bargaining or "meet and discuss" units of supervisors,
or be completely denied bargaining rights. Because of these short-
comings, the task of deciding these issues fell on the PLRB. 36 At this
time, the PLRB strikes a middle ground and includes supervisors in
rank-and-file bargaining units. 7 Chiefs of police are included in
rank-and-file units when the police force consists of fewer than ten
persons.38 When ten or more persons are involved, however, the
chief is presumed to be a managerial employee, and not an employee
for collective bargaining purposes.39 No courts have addressed the
propriety of this resolution as of yet.
2. Management Level Employees. -PERA both defines who
the federal statute and PERA. See notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text supra. Therefore,
the NLRB cases should not be looked to for guidance in construing who is a supervisor under
PERA. See PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 499, 337 A.2d 262, 264
(1975).
33. Upper Darby School Dist., I P.P.E.R. 85 (PLRB 1971). See also Bethel Park School
Dist., I P.P.E.R. 51 (PLRB 1971); Tyrone Area School Dist., 1 P.P.E.R. 45 (PLRB 1971);
Ephrata School Dist., I P.P.E.R. 25 (PLRB 1971).
34. See PLRB v. AFSCME, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 572, 576, 342 A.2d 155, 157-58 (1975).
35. Chambersburg Area School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 144 (PLRB 1975); Wilkes-Barre Gen.
Hosp., 3 P.P.E.R. 30 (PLRB 1973). The definition of a supervisor in other legislation does not
control the PLRB's determination. North Schuylkill School Dist., I P.P.E.R. 28 (PLRB 1971).
36. Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. PLRB, 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977) mandated
that the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act of June I, 1937, Pub. L. 1168, No. 294, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-211.13 (Purdon Supp. 1979) be read inparimateria with Act 11, thereby
filling the gaps in the latter statute. See generally Decker, The PLRB's New Jurisdictionfor
Police and Firemen, 16 DuQ. L. REV. 185 (1977-78).
37. See, e.g., City of Easton, 9 P.P.E.R. 9019 (PLRB 1978) (firemen).
38. The PLRB promulgated the rule that chiefs of police are presumptively rank-and-file
employees when the police force consists of fewer than ten persons in Lower Allen Twp., 9
P.P.E.R. 376 (PLRB 1977).
39. Id. The presumption is rebuttable, however. Compare Centerville Borough Police
Dept., 10 P.P.E.R. 10030 (PLRB 1979) (police chief included in rank-and-file bargaining
unit) with Borough of Watsontown, 10 P.P.E.R. 10033 (PLRB 1979) (although less than ten
employees on the police force, police chief had responsibilities for policy and budget, thereby
exercising managerial authority warranting exclusion from rank-and-file unit). A police chief
may be included even though the parties stipulate that the appropriate bargaining unit does
not include the police chief. Bethlehem Twp., 10 P.P.E.R. 10050 (PLRB 1979).
are "management level employees,"4 and excludes them from its
definition of "public employee."'" They are accorded neither bar-
gaining nor "meet and discuss" rights.
Once again, PERA incorporated an exclusion developed by the
National Labor Relations Board for the private sector.42 The
PLRB's occasional application of the NLRB's definition 43 can be
challenged whenever an application of that test results in a denial of
managerial status mandated by PERA's definition." In short, the
PLRB can look to NLRB cases for guidance, but PERA's statutory
definition must control.45
As discussed previously, managerial employees are also ex-
cluded from coverage under Act 11 1 under a quantitative test devel-
oped by the PLRB.46
3. Confidential Employees.-The final category of employees
excluded from the definition of "public employee" under PERA are
confidential employees. 47 As with the categories of supervisors and
management level employees, the exclusion is intended to avoid a
commingling of employees that may jeopardize the formulation and
implementation of the public employer's labor relations policy.
Again, PERA expressly defines who is a confidential em-
ployee,48 and again, the PLRB on occasion adopts and applies the
definition of confidential employees developed by the National La-
bor Relations Board for the private sector.49 Although this practice
was disapproved by the Commonwealth Court," the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concluded that the PLRB may apply the National
Labor Relations Board definition of confidential employee to narrow
40. "Management level employe means any individual who is involved directly in the
determination of policy or who responsibly directs the implementation thereof and shall in-
clude all employes above the first level of supervision." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(16)
(Purdon Supp. 1979).
41. Id. § 1101.301(2).
42. The NLRB definition is discussed at length in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267 (1974).
43. See, e.g., Bucks County, 8 P.P.E.R. 26 (PLRB 1976); Philadelphia School Dist., 4
P.P.E.R. 128 (PLRB 1974).
44. See PLRB v. Altoona Area School Dist., 480 Pa. 148, 389 A.2d 553 (1978).
45. See PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
46. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.301(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
48. Id. § 1101.301(13).
49. West Shore School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. I (PLRB 1973) and Churchill School Dist., 2
P.P.E.R. 26 (PLRB 1972). The PLRB stated,
[T]he Board has definitely adopted the National Labor Relations Board's definition
of confidential employe to the effect that no employe can be classified as confidential
unless he or she is a secretary or aide to a principal managerial employe engaged in
formulating or carrying out major labor relations policy and that such managing did
not include first level supervisors because they handle grievances at the first level.
50. PLRB v. Altoona Area School Dist., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 344, 352 A.2d 560 (1976),
rev'd in part, 480 Pa. 148, 389 A.2d 553 (1978).
the scope of the statutory definition provided in PERA.5'
D. Certification of the Exclusive Bargaining Representative
The representative selected by public employees in a unit ap-
propriate for collective bargaining is the exclusive representative of
all the employees in that unit 5 2 a practice consonant with the pri-
vate sector approach. 3 PERA allows for voluntary recognition of a
collective bargaining representative 5 4 or for an election that may re-
sult in certification of a union as the representative of the bargaining
unit by the PLRB.55 Whatever the procedure, the bargaining repre-
sentative is intended to be the representative desired by a majority of
the employees in the bargaining unit. The statutory scheme is
designed to enable the employees to choose or reject union represen-
tation without coercion by the employer or the union.
Unlike the detailed procedures spelled out in PERA, Act I 11,
which controls bargaining by policemen and firemen, makes no pro-
vision for determining an appropriate bargaining unit or for electing
a bargaining representative. In Philadelhia Fire Officers Association
v. PLRB"6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved the problem
by ruling that Act 11 1 was intended to operate in conjunction with
the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act,5 7 which does provide election
procedures. 8 Although the decision provided a means of determin-
ing a majority representative for an appropriate bargaining unit of
policemen or firemen by the PLRB, in practical effect the decision
created what is analogous to a common law of labor relations.5 9
I. Voluntary Recognition.-A public employer voluntarily rec-
ognizes a union by filing a "joint request for certification," a form
that enables the PLRB to make a determination regarding the appro-
51. PLRB v. Altoona Area School Dist., 480 Pa. 148, 156, 389 A.2d 553, 557 (1978).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See also McCluskey v.
Commonwealth, 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 598, 391 A.2d 45 (1978) (holding that only the union, and
not the employee whose grievance was arbitrated, has standing to appeal the arbitral award
when the labor agreement gives the union the exclusive right to invoke arbitration).
Individual employees or a group of employees may, nevertheless, present grievances to
their public employer without the intervention of the union so long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the union is given the
opportunity to be present. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Purdon Supp. 1979). A provi-
sion in a collective bargaining agreement giving the union the exclusive right to invoke arbitra-
tion should, therefore, be effective in giving the union exclusive control over the grievance
procedure.
53. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.602(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
55. Id. §§ l101.603(a)-(d).
56. Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. PLRB, 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977).
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-211.13 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
58. Id. § 211.7.
59. See generally Decker, The PLRB's New Jurisdiction for Policemen and Firemen, 16
DUQ. L. REV. 185, 191-99 (1977-78).
priateness of the proposed collective bargaining unit.60 It is still nec-
essary for the PLRB to find the proposed unit appropriate for
collective bargaining purposes, however, and an employer that vol-
untarily recognizes a minority union risks being found guilty of un-
lawful interference with the rights of its employees. 6' Additionally,
the public employer might be found guilty of unlawful domination
of a labor organization. 62 Similarly, a union that accepts representa-
tion of employees when it knows it is not the choice of the majority
of those employees might be unlawfully interfering with the rights of
the employees. 63 Thus, while the procedure is simple, it is not with-
out its risks for both the public employer and the union in the con-
text of employees covered by PERA. In contrast, voluntary
recognition of a union purporting to represent policemen and
firemen covered under Act 111 might pose a risk only for public em-
ployers.64
2. Elections.-An election is the preferred means of recogniz-
ing a representative of public employees. It involves the resolution
of two issues: the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, and the
choice or rejection by the public employees of a union to represent
them. Because of its complexity, the election procedure is discussed
in greater depth.
E Elections
A public employer may obtain an election either by joining in a
"joint election request" 65 or by refusing a request for a consent elec-
tion and forcing the union to file a petition for representation,66 but
the former should not be used if the public employer intends to dis-
pute the makeup of the proposed bargaining unit.67 Additionally, a
public employer can file a petition for an election, but only when the
union demands recognition by notice that thirty percent or more of
60. 34 Pa. Code § 95.11 (1979). The PLRB has statutory authority for promulgating
rules and regulations necessary to implement PERA. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.502 (Pur-
don Supp. 1979).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1101.1201(a)(l) (Purdon Supp. 1979). Unfair labor practices
are discussed at notes 151-219 and accompanying text infra.
62. Id. § 1101.1201(a)(2).
63. Id. § l101.1201(b)(l).
64. The PLRB construes Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. PLRB, 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d
259 (1977) as giving the PLRB jurisdiction over charges of unfair labor practices under Act
11. City of Easton, 9 P.P.E.R. 1 9019 (PLRB 1978).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.603(a) and (b) (Purdon Supp. 1979); 34 Pa. Code
§ 95.13 (1979).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.603(c) (Purdon Supp. 1979); 34 Pa. Code § 95.14
(1979). See also § 95.13(8).
67. In Venago/Clarion Mental Health Center, 10 P.P.E.R. 10002 (PLRB 1978), the
public employer and union stipulated the appropriateness of the unit, and the PLRB did not
allow a unit clarification subsequently sought by the employer to change the unit composition.
The PLRB reasoned that the employer had a full opportunity to present its views in the repre-
sentation hearing. Id.
the employees want to be represented by that union and fails to re-
quest an election."
1. Showing of Interest.-Before the PLRB will process a re-
quest for an election, thirty percent or more of the employees in "an
appropriate unit" must want to be represented by a particular
union.69 The showing of interest can be made by authorization cards
signed by the employees, or by a petition. No one but the PLRB's
agents can investigate the "showing of interest,"7 and the PLRB's
determination regarding the cards is immune from collateral at-
tack.7'
2. Intervention. -The filing of a petition to represent a group
of employees by one union may trigger interest in other unions that
will also seek representative status by intervening in the election. An
intervenor must have a ten percent "showing of interest" to partici-
pate in the representation hearing, but needs only a one percent
showing to have its name placed on the ballot.72
3. Election Procedures.-Section 605 of PERA expressly spells
out the procedures for the conduct of the election, 73 and it is supple-
mented by additional rules and regulations promulgated by the
PLRB.74 Elections are conducted by secret ballot and no bargaining
representative will be certified unless it receives a majority of the
ballots cast. 75 Hence, ballots must include a choice for "no represen-
tative" although a "no representative" choice need not be offered in
a "run-off election" when two or more unions participate.76
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.603(d) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
69. Id. § 1101.603. The PLRB will not go forward with an election if no party produces
a thirty percent showing of interest. 34 Pa. Code § 95.14 (1979).
70. 34 Pa. Code § 95.17.
7 I. ld. The justifications for refusing to consider defects in showings of interest by au-
thorization cards or petitions are that an examination might intimidate employees into not
signing because the employer would see the signatures, and that considering defects is not
necessary because any mistakes in securing cards will be corrected by the election. See Oxford
School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R., 1 10043 (PLRB 1979); Reading Community Hosp., 2 P.P.E.R. 7
(PLRB 1972). The PLRB refuses to consider charges that the union misrepresented the pur-
pose of the authorization cards in order to obtain signatures, or deem the cards void. See City
of Philadelphia, 6 P.P.E.R. 345 (PLRB 1975); York County, 5 P.P.E.R. 2 (PLRB 1974); Wil-
liamsport Area Community College, 3 P.P.E.R. 296 (PLRB 1973).
72. 34 Pa. Code § 95.14(10) (1979). The PLRB rules for intervention are found at 34 Pa.
Code § 95.44 (1979).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.605 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
74. 34 Pa. Code §§ 95-11-95.22 and 95.51-95.57 (1979).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.605(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979). Note that it is not a ma-
jority of the persons in the collective bargaining unit.
Void ballots are not considered a vote cast, but rather, are completely disregarded. Albert
Einstein Med. Center v. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 613, 374 A.2d 761 (1977). The
PLRB will void ballots when the voters fail to follow the instructions for filling in ballots.
Pottsgrove School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 66 (PLRB 1976) (writing "yes" or "no" rather than placing
an "X" in the appropriate box).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.605(4) and (5) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
4. Challenges and Objections to Elections.-The PLRB must
certify the results of an election unless an unfair labor practice oc-
curred that affected the outcome of the election.77 If the charging
party proves an unfair labor practice occurred, the guilty party has
the burden of proving that its conduct did not affect the outcome of
the election78 if the election is to stand.
The types of conduct that require the setting aside of an election
are many and varied.79 Among them are captive audience speeches
shortly before the election,8" misleading statements and campaign
trickery,8 and increases in pay or benefits shortly before the elec-
tion,82 although increases may be permissible when made at the cus-
tomary time of the year for such increases.83 No electioneering is
permitted at the polling place,84 and supervisors or management per-
sonnel, as well as union officials, should stay away from the polling
area.
85
Challenges may also be made at the time of the election regard-
ing the eligibility of certain employees to vote. Among the grounds
for such challenges are that the employee was hired after the date of
preparation of the list of eligible voters,86 that the employee resigned
77. Id. § 1101.605(6). One such unfair labor practice is violating any of the rules and
regulations established by the Board regulating the conduct of representation elections." Id.
§ 1101.1201(a)(7) (employer) and (b)(4) (union).
78. Western Psychiatric Inst. v. PLRB, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 204, 213, 330 A.2d 257, 262
(1974).
79. See the discussion of unfair labor practices notes 177-210 and accompanying text
infra.
80. The PLRB has yet to find that meetings were compulsory or that the public employer
made misrepresentations likely to affect the outcome of the election. See Williamsport Area
Community College, 8 P.P.E.R. 143 (PLRB 1977); Monongahela Valley Hosp., 3 P.P.E.R. 374
(PLRB 1973); Unionville-Chadds Ford School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 178 (PLRB 1973); McKeesport
Hosp., 3 P.P.E.R. 21 (PLRB 1974); Conemaugh Valley Mem. Hosp., 2 P.P.E.R. 115 (PLRB
1972).
81. The PLRB is generous in its approach to campaign propaganda. See, e.g., Lebanon
County, 5 P.P.E.R. 55 (PLRB 1974); Lehigh County, 2 P.P.E.R. 214 (PLRB 1972). Neverthe-
less, it ordered a new election when a public employer made misrepresentations about union-
imposed fines. Unionville-Chadds Ford School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 178 (PLRB 1973).
82. See Williamsport Area Community College, 8 P.P.E.R. 143 (PLRB 1977).
83. Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County, 6 P.P.E.R. 217 (PLRB 1975); Union-
ville-Chadds Ford School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 178 (PLRB 1973). Cf Conemaugh Valley Mem.
Hosp., 2 P.P.E.R. 115 (PLRB 1972) (increase in benefits consonant with employer's past prac-
tice, but insurance refund checks prepared three weeks before election and not mailed until
two days before the election voided the election).
84. 34 Pa. Code § 95.53 (1979). Cf. Oil City Hosp., 3 P.P.E.R. 262 (PLRB 1973); United
Steelworkers, 3 P.P.E.R. 22 (PLRB 1973) (electioneering in places away from the polling area).
85. The PLRB voids elections when supervisors or managerial employees are in the pol-
ling place. Police, Fireman and Park Police Medical Ass'n, Inc., 3 P.P.E.R. 81 (PLRB 1973);
McKeesport Area School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 48 (PLRB 1973). Cf International Union of Oper-
ating Eng'rs, 3 P.P.E.R. 87 (PLRB 1973) (brief presence of union representative in the polling
area not a basis for voiding the election).
86. In Pottsgrove School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 66, 67 (PLRB 1976), the PLRB ruled that a
permissible cutoff date for determining eligibility to vote could be determined by using the
payroll date prior to (I) the date of the filing of the election petition; (2) a different agreed
upon date; or (3) the payroll date prior to the representation hearing or the PLRB's order of
election. See, e.g., Lebanon School Dist., 4 P.P.E.R. 21 (PLRB 1974).
or gave notice of an intent to quit, 87 or that the employee was laid-off
for a substantial period of time.88 Challenged ballots are not
counted unless they are determinative of the election.89
5. Decertlication Elections.-To protect the employees' right
to engage or decline from engaging in union activity, PERA permits
decertification of an existing union through an election procedure9"
that is similar to the election procedures discussed above. Either the
employees or the public employer may file a decertification petition.
The public employer may file when it has a good faith doubt regard-
ing the union's majority status,9 but it cannot refuse to bargain with
the union on the basis of that good faith doubt,92 interrogate em-
ployees regarding their union sentiments, or lend assistance to
groups of employees opposed to their union.
93
A decertification election may be challenged in much the same
manner as an election to represent employees. 94 Furthermore, the
bars applicable to representation elections also apply to decertifica-
tion elections.
6. Bars to Elections.-Two important restrictions exist regard-
ing when elections may be conducted. The first restriction is the
"certification year" bar, which bars elections in bargaining units in
which an election was conducted within the preceding twelve-month
period.9 5 The bar is intended to promote a degree of labor stability,
and it affords the union time to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement before it is threatened with ouster by the employees. Sim-
ilarly, the public employer who defeated a union drive is ensured a
period of labor peace.
The second limitation on when elections may be held is the
"contract bar" rule.96 This rule forbids the holding of an election
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. It does not
87. Lysockview County Home, 5 P.P.E.R. 100 (PLRB 1974); Lower Dauphin School
Dist., 5 P.P.E.R. 29 (PLRB 1974).
88. United Cerebral Palsy, 8 P.P.E.R. 137 (PLRB 1977) (laid-off one year).
89. Challenged ballots must be placed in an envelope marked with the employees name
and the reason for the challenge. Ballots not segregated in this manner, cannot be challenged
after the election. West Shore School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 38 (PLRB 1973).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.607 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
91. Id. § 1101.607(ii). See also 34 Pa. Code & 95.22 (1979).
92. Houtzdale Mun. Auth., 6 P.P.E.R. 283 (PLRB 1975); Monogahela Valley Hosp., 3
P.P.E.R. 372 (PLRB 1973) (challenge to PLRB certification was pending).
93. See the discussion of employer unfair labor practices at notes 177-180 and accompa-
nying text infra.
94. See Springfield-Delaware County School Dist., 4 P.P.E.R. 66 (PLRB 1974); Philadel-
phia School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. I 1 (PLRB 1973).
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.605(7)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1979). The twelve-month pe-
riod runs from the date of the election. Lebanon School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 25 (PLRB 1975).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § i101.605(7)(iii) (Purdon Supp. 1979). This doctrine is ex-
amined in depth in Decker, The Contract Bar Doctrine in Pennsylvania's Public Sector Labor
Relations, 39 U. PIrTT. L. REV. 495 (1978).
apply, however, for any part of the term of the collective bargaining
agreement that exceeds three years.97 The purpose of the rule is sim-
ply to prevent the disruption of a collective bargaining agreement.
Nevertheless, petitions by employees who want to decertify the
union or select a new one are permitted within a thirty day "window
period," which is that period no sooner than ninety days or later
than sixty days before the expiration of the labor agreement.9"
III. Collective Bargaining and "Meet and Discuss"
A. The Bargaining Timetable Under PERA
The formal procedures for collective bargaining in the private
sector pale when compared to the formalities established by PERA.
The following is a breakdown of the procedure required for bargain-
ing under PERA.
Step 1-Call in mediation
The Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation must be called in,
(1) 21 days after negotiations commence; but
(2) no later than 150 days prior to the budget submission date.99
Step 2-Notify the PLRB 0/failure to agree
Mediation continues for so long as the parties fail to reach agree-
ment. No later than 130 days prior to the budget submission date,
however, the Bureau of Mediation will notify the PLRB if no
agreement has been reached. °°
Step 3-Facqnding
On receiving notice, the PLRB in its discretion may appoint a
panel of factfinders. After hearings and not more than 40 days
after the Bureau of Mediation notifies the PLRB of failure to
agree, the panel makes findings of fact and recommendations that
are sent to the parties and the PLRB.''
Step 4-The parties accept or rejectfacyfnding
The parties must accept or reject the recommendations and find-




The panel of factfinders publicizes its recommendations and find-
ings of fact if the findings are not accepted by the parties." 3
Step 6-Parties given further opportunity to accept or reectfacfnd-
ing
Acceptance or rejection by the parties must occur not less than five
or more than ten days after publication.'4
Step 7-Striking becomes permissible
97. Moreover, extensions of collective bargaining agreements do not affect the expiration
date of the agreement for contract bar purposes. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.605(7)(i) (Pur-
don Supp. 1979).
98. Id. § 1!01.605(7)(ii).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.801 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
100. Id. § 1101.802.
101. Id. § 1101.802(1).
102. Id. § 1101.802(2).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 1101.802(3).
Employees are free to strike if the dispute is not settled prior to the
exhaustion of the above procedures."'
Clearly the legislature was not anxious to afford employees a
quick access to the right to strike. The purpose of mediation and
factfinding serves more than a dilatory function, however. Media-
tion can bring the parties together by limiting and clarifying the is-
sues in dispute and emphasizing the areas in which agreement is
actually possible. Factfinding is some indication to the parties of
how an impartial third person would resolve the dispute. Moreover,
the publication of the recommendations and findings of fact can
bring public pressure to bear on the parties.
Although mediation is mandatory, factfinding is not. The Com-
monwealth Court ruled that a failure to utilize mediation requires
the enjoining of a strike."° A union can strike, however, if media-
tion is exhausted even if the PLRB fails or declines to appoint a
factfinder or factfinding panel.
t0 7
B. The Bargaining Timetable Under Act 111
In contrast to the bargaining timetable under PERA, which is
keyed to the budget submission date of the municipality, 0 8 bargain-
ing under Act 111 is keyed to the start of the fiscal year.
Step 1-Bargaining begins
Collective bargaining begins at least six months before the start of
the fiscal year. ° 9
Step 2-Request for arbitration
A request for arbitration must be made at least 110 days before
the beginning of the fiscal year, and is conditioned on an impasse
in bargaining. "0 Impasse occurs when
(1) it may be factually established;
(2) the parties do not reach settlement of the disputed issues
within 30 days after collective bargaining is initiated;
(3) in the case of political subdivisions as public employers, the
agreement is not approved by the appropriate lawmaking
body within 30 days after agreement;
105. Id. § 1101.1003. Strikes before exhaustion of the above procedures may be enjoined
regardless of whether the strike presents a clear and present danger or threat to the health,
safety, or welfare of the public. Id. § 1101.1002.
106. Port Auth. of Allegheny County v. Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union, 34 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 71, 81, 383 A.2d 954, 980 (1978); United Transp. Union v. SEPTA, 22 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 25, 347 A.2d 509 (1975).
107. Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n v. Bellefonte Area Bd. of Educ., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 210,
304 A.2d 922 (1973). This is so, even if mediation is continuing after the PLRB declines to
appoint a factfinder so long as the PLRB determines that an impasse in bargaining exists. 9
Pa. Commw. Ct. at 219, 304 A.2d at 926.
108. The Commonwealth Court noted that one of the purposes of PERA's bargaining
timetable was to assure that "the public employer's proposed budget of expenditures can be
adequately prepared in time for submission to the appropriate governing body for final action
on the date for which such submission is required by law or practice .... " United Transp.
Union v. SEPTA, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 25, 31, 347 A.2d 509, 512 (1975).
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.3 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
110. Id.
(4) in the case of the Commonwealth as public employer, the
agreement is not approved by the legislature within six
months after agreement."'
Step 3-Selection of arbitrators
The members of the board of arbitrators representing the em-
ployer and the employees must be selected within five days after
the request for arbitration. 112
Step 4--Proceedings
Within ten days after the appointment of the third, impartial arbi-
trator by the two party-appointed arbitrators, the board of arbitra-
tors commences its proceedings. It must complete its proceedings
within thirty days after the appointment of the third arbitrator.'
Although the Commonwealth Court held the time limits for ar-
bitration under Act 111 to be mandatory," 4 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ruled that strict compliance with the time schedules
by a union is not necessary if the public employer is dilatory and not
prejudiced by the deviation."l5
C. The Scope of Bargaining
The subject matter of collective bargaining can be categorized
under three headings: mandatory, permissive, and nonbargain-
able." 6 Generally speaking, mandatory subjects of bargaining en-
compass matters of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment; permissive subjects are matters the employer may in its
discretion bargain; and nonbargainable items are subjects contrary
to law.
Federal court and National Labor Relations Board precedent
are not necessarily controlling in deciding what is bargainable under
PERA and Act 111 for several reasons. First, the profit motive
dominates private sector bargaining while in public sector bargain-
I11. Id. § 217.4(a).
112. Id. § 217.4(b).
113. Id.
114. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 463 v. City of Johnstown, 21 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 223, 344 A.2d 754 (1975), rev'd, 468 Pa. 96, 360 A.2d 197 (1976).
115. [A]ppellant's request for collective bargaining sessions and appellee's dilatory
procedure in scheduling the sessions relieve appellant of the burden of meeting the
scheme set out in Act I 1. Moreover, the appellee is not prejudiced by the decision
that they must arbitrate the labor contract.
Association of Firefighters v. City of Johnstown, 468 Pa. 96, 99 360 A.2d 197, 198 (1976).
The lesson is that timeliness in bargaining and requesting arbitration is required, but the
public employer cannot delay to take advantage of statutory time limits. See also Plymouth
Twp. Police Dept. v. Plymouth Twp. Comm'nrs, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 64, 366 A.2d 316 (1976);
Borato v. Borough of Midland, 48 D.&C.2d 510 (C.P. Beaver 1969); Local 736 v. City of
Williamsport, 47 D.&.C.2d 317 (C.P. Lycoming 1969).
116. See generally NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The typology is
equally applicable to PERA.
The scope of bargaining for school teachers is examined in Comment, .4 Power Shi in
Public School Management, 80 DICK. L. REV. 795 (1976) and Comment, The Scope of Collec-
tive Bargaining in Public Education Under the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act, 14
DUQ. L. REV. 427, 439-66 (1976). Bowles, Defining the Scope of Bargainingfor Teacher Negoti-
ations: 4 Study of JudicialApproaches, 29 LAB. L.J. 649 (1978) provides a more generalized
overview of how different state courts approach the scope of bargaining problem.
ing the primary concern must be the public interest." 7 Second, the
statutory language of PERA differs from the federal law." 8 A third
reason is that statutes and municipal home rule charters provide an
additional dimension to public sector collective bargaining." 1
9
Nevertheless, the fundamental principle of exclusive representa-
tion embodied in federal private sector labor law applies to PERA.
The existence of contracts with individual employees does not re-
lieve the public employer of the duty to bargain with the union rep-
resenting those employees, and the collective bargaining agreement
supersedes individual contracts.
20
L Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining.-PLRB v. State College
School District'2' set forth a balancing test for determining whether
a particular matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining under
PERA. Simply stated, an inquiry must be made whether the matter
weighs more heavily on the employees' interests in wages, hours, and
working conditions than on the public employer's right and duty to
manage the political entity. 122 Finding a matter to be a mandatory.
subject of bargaining is a critical determination because if the matter
is not mandatory the public employer has no obligation to bargain in
good faith and the union has no right to insist to the point of impasse
on inclusion of that matter in a collective bargaining agreement. In
sum, the public employer does not commit an unfair labor practice
by refusing to bargain on the subject, 123 and the union cannot law-
fully create a bargaining impasse and strike when a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining is not involved.1 24
117. See Sackman, Redefning the Scope of Bargaining in Public Employment, 19 B.C. L.
REV. 155 (1977). In determining what is not a subject of mandatory bargaining, an analogy
exists between "the core of entrepreneurial control" of the private sector spoken of in
Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) and
PERA's "matters of inherent managerial policy," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Purdon
Supp. 1979).
118. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court states that when the statutory language differs,
"analogies have limited application and the experience gained in the private employment sec-
tor will not necessarily provide an infallible basis for a monolithic model for public employ-
ment." PLRB v. State College School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 500, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975).
119. PERA prohibits the implementation of provisions in violation of, or inconsistent
with, statutes or home rule charters. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
See also id. at §§ 1101.701 and 1101.702.
120. Canon-McMillan School Dist., 2 P.P.E.R. 150 (PLRB 1972); Beaver County Com-
munity College, 2 P.P.E.R. 131 (PLRB 1972). See also Jefferson-Morgan School Dist., . 9
P.P.E.R. 9056 (PLRB 1978). This principle emerged early in the development of federal
private sector law. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-38 (1944). See also notes 52
and 53 and accompanying text supra.
121. 461 Pa. 494, 507, 337 A.2d 262, 268 (1975). See also Labor, 1975-1976 Survey of
Pennsylvania Law, 38 U. PiT-r. L. REV. 185, 200-12 (1976).
122. 461 Pa. at 507, 337 A.2d at 268. This balancing test was reaffirmed in PLRB v. Mars
School Dist., 480 Pa. 295, 299-300, 389 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1978).
123. See notes 155-169 and accompanying text infra.
124. See notes 105-07 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of impasse bargain-
ing under federal private sector labor law, see Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in
Good Faith, 39 U. Prr-r. L. REV. 1 (1977).
Because the Legislature chose to follow the federal private sec-
tor approach of allowing the scope of bargaining to evolve through
litigation, a definitive and all inclusive statement of the mandatory
subjects of bargaining under PERA is impossible."'2 Each year will
bring new bargaining proposals and new disputes regarding what is
and is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.
2. Nonbargainable Subjects.-Section 703 of PERA prohibits
the implementation of provisions in a collective bargaining agree-
ment that are either in violation of or conflict with statutes or provi-
sions of home rule charters.' 26 This limitation on bargainable items
is, however, narrowly construed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled that the mere presence of statutes dealing with wages, hours, or
conditions of employment does not preclude the parties from bar-
gaining over these subjects.' 27 Collective bargaining provisions can
be implemented insofar as they do not conflict with such statutes,
and moreover, can go beyond statutory minimums without being in-
consistent with the statute.
28
Often parties challenged arbitration awards alleging that imple-
mentation of the award would violate section 703.129 Pittsburgh Joint
Collective Bargaining Committee v. City of Pittsburgh,13 ° however,
appears to require that all questions concerning the legality of bar-
gaining proposals be raised by a refusal to bargain charge.13 ' Al-
though the negotiating parties now must question the legality of
bargaining proposals under the unfair labor practice provisions of
PERA, 32 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allows concerned citizen
125. The alternative approach of a statutory listing of specific items that are or are not
bargainable is disfavored as too rigid. Among the reasons posited are that the list could never
be complete, a recognition that the evolution of the scope of bargaining is limited only by the
imagination of the negotiating parties, and that it wodld discourage negotiations on subjects
that might be appropriate for bargaining in certain situations. REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S
STUDY COMM'N ON PUB. EMP. LAB. REL. 19 (1978). The nonexclusive list of matters of inher-
ent managerial policy set out in section 702 of PERA is, however, an attempt more narrowly to
define mandatory subjects of bargaining. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Purdon Supp.
1979).
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
127. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 508, 337 A.2d 262, 269 (1975).
128. Milberry v. Board of Educ., 467 Pa. 79, 354 A.2d 559 (1976) (requirements for dis-
charge of a teacher); Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 3, 464 Pa.
92, 346 A.2d 35 (1975) (requirements for discharge of a teacher); PLRB v. State College Area
School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975) (salary levels).
129. See, e.g., Dauphin County Tech. School Educ. Ass'n v. Dauphin County Area Voca-
tional Tech. School Bd., 483 Pa. 604, 398 A.2d 168 (1978), aff'g by an equally divided court 24
Pa. Commw. Ct. 639, 357 A.2d 721 (1976).
130. 481 Pa. 66, 391 A.2d 1318 (1978).
131. Id. at 75, 391 A.2d at 1323.
132. This approach suggested by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is questionable. It is
naive to assume that a party to a collective bargaining agreement can forsee all possible con-
structions that might be given to a provision of the agreement by an arbitrator. Therefore, no
means of ascertaining in advance whether an arbitral award might require an affirmative ille-
gal act exists.
groups to challenge the legality of provisions of collective bargaining
agreements by seeking an injunction in common pleas court.' 3 3
3. Act 111.-Because Act I ll requires interest arbitration in
the event of a bargaining impasse,' 34 scope of bargaining issues
under Act 111 typically come to the courts as challenges to arbitral
awards. In general, the bargainability or arbitrability of specific
items depends on whether the matter is a legitimate condition of em-
ployment, 35 or an item on which the governing body can lawfully
carry out the agreement or award. 136 The applications of these basic
guidelines are not always consistent or free of theoretical difficul-
ties. 137
D. 'Meet and Discuss"
The public employer's obligation to "meet and discuss," differs
substantially from the duty to bargain in good faith. The most sig-
nificant distinction is that decisions on matters after "meet and dis-
cuss" sessions remain with the public employer, whose
determination is final on any issue or issues raised.
38
An obligation to "meet and discuss" arises in two situations-
when "bargaining" with first level supervisors, 139 and when "bar-
gaining" with rank-and-fie employees on a matter of inherent man-
agerial policy."4 Often a union will bargain legally bargainable
matters, and at the same time, demand bargaining on matters of in-
herent managerial policy. The PLRB holds that the employer has a
133. Parents Union for Pub. Schools v. Board of Educ., 480 Pa. 194, 389 A.2d 577 (1978).
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.4(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979). See notes 110-115 and ac-
companying text supra.
135. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Scranton, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 513, 364
A.2d 753 (1976) (extra pay for policemen based on graduate courses taken was proper); Appeal
of Ross Twp., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 541, 346 A.2d 836 (1975) (shifts, hours of work, promotion
procedures, and deletion of discipline from personnel records are proper subjects of bargain-
ing); Cheltenham Twp. v. Cheltenham Police Dept., II Pa. Commw. Ct. 348, 312 A.2d 835
(1973) (picking up officers in police cars and driving them to the station to begin work is not a
benefit to be bargained or awarded in arbitration).
136. The leading case is the Washington Arbitration Case, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437
(1969), in which the court allowed the narrow illegality exception the bar on appeals from the
arbitrators' awards contained in Act I 1. Id. at 174, 259 A.2d at 441. The judicial construc-
tion accorded illegality of subjects of bargaining under PERA might also apply under Act Ill
so that statutory benefit levels will be construed as minimums, and not a limitation on bargain-
ing. See notes 126-28 and accompanying text supra.
137. Compare Allegheny County Firefighters, Local 1038 v. Allegheny County, 7 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 81, 299 A.2d 60 (1973) (arbitrators cannot award a grievance arbitration proce-
dure because it is not a proper subject of bargaining) with Appeal of City of Bethlehem, 27 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 592, 598, 367 A.2d 409, 412 (1976) (Bowman, P.J., concurring) (suggesting that
although arbitrators cannot properly award an arbitration procedure, the parties may lawfully
agree to arbitrate their differences in a collective bargaining agreement, and be bound by that
agreement). See also Cheltenham Twp. v. Cheltenham Police Dept., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 360,
301 A.2d 430 (1973).
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(17) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
139. Id. § 1101.704.
140. Id. § 1101.702.
right to demand that the "meet and discuss" matters be removed
from the bargaining table so that bargaining can proceed on bar-
gainable matters alone.' 4 ' In one case, a public employer and a la-
bor organization reached a written "meet and discuss" agreement,
denominated a "memorandum of understanding." The PLRB ruled
that this agreement was not binding on the public employer,
42
which ruling is sound because the statutory definition of "meet and
discuss" precludes affording finality to such an agreement. 143 Agree-
ments reached in "meet and discuss," unlike agreements reached in
collective bargaining, need not be reduced to writing.
Apparently, the Commonwealth Court followed a rationale that
"meet and discuss" is not unlike permissive bargaining in the private
sector when it concluded that a public employer who bargains and
finalizes an agreement on a matter of inherent managerial policy is
bound by that agreement. '1  This decision may be limited to the
facts of that particular case because the decision fails to give full
weight to the statutory provision that any final decisions or determi-
nations on "meet and discuss" items remain with the public em-
ployer. 146
Just what are "meet and discuss" items for first level supervisor
units is relatively clear-all matters that may be bargained with
rank-and-file employee units. 4' The only matters that are "meet
and discuss" items for rank-and-file employee units are those of "in-
herent managerial policy.' 14 Precisely what is a matter of inherent
managerial policy is an area of the law that is still developing and
lacking in certainty. Some guidance is provided by the reason for
the meet and discuss requirement-"to permit input from the em-
ployes on policy matters affecting wages, hours and terms and condi-
tions of employment so as to assist the public employer in ultimately
making its discretionary resolution or disposition of the issues in
141. Williamsport Educ. Ass'n, 6 P.P.E.R. 57 (PLRB 1975); Littlestown Area School Dist.,
3 P.P.E.R. 383 (PLRB 1973);' Richland School Dist., 4 P.P.E.R. 2 (PLRB 1974); Littlestown
Educ. Ass'n, 3 P.P.E.R. 383 (PLRB 1973).
142. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 6 P.P.E.R. 176 (PLRB 1975).
143. See note 138 and accompanying text supra.
144. PERA makes it an unfair labor practice for either an employer or union to refuse to
reduce a collective bargaining agreement to writing. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1201(a)(6) and
(b)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979). See notes 175 and 176 and accompanying text infra.
145. Scranton School Bd. v. Scranton Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1147, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct.
152, 365 A.2d 1339 (1976).
146. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(17) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
147. Id. § 1101.704. Therefore, application of the PLRB v. State College Area School
Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975) balancing test determines what is a "meet and discuss"
item for first level supervisors as well as what is a subject of mandatory bargaining regarding
rank-and-file employees. See notes 121 and 122 and accompanying text supra.
148. The nonexclusive statutory examples are "the functions and programs of the public
employers, standards of services, its overall budget, utilization of technology, the organiza-
tional structure and selection and direction of personnel." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702
(Purdon Supp. 1979).
question."' 49 Therefore, changes instituted by a public employer
that clearly affect the interests of a significant number of employees
triggers an obligation to "meet and discuss" the changes with the
employee representative organization. 5 °
IV. Unfair Labor Practices
The right of public employees to join or organize employee rep-
resentative organizations or engage in lawful concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection
and the right to refrain from such activities'5" are protected by the
unfair labor practice section of PERA. That section contains nine
unfair labor practices under each of two subsections, one governing
public employers, '1 2 and the other governing employee organiza-
tions.'53 PERA gives the PLRB exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate
in the first instance charges of unfair labor practices."'
A. Refusal to Bargain
Probably the key unfair labor practice is the one prohibiting
public employers and employee organizations from refusing to bar-
gain in good faith.' 55 A refusal to bargain can arise from widely
divergent factual situations. The common and recurring ones are ex-
amined and discussed.
1. Refusal to Provide Information.-A refusal to bargain oc-
curs when the public employer refuses to provide a union with infor-
mation that is reasonably necessary to collective bargaining or the
administration of a collective bargaining agreement. 15 6 A union
cannot intelligently bargain without knowing, for example, the wage
structure and benefits of the employer. Similarly, the duty to pro-
vide information extends to administration of the collective bargain-
149. PLRB v. APSCUF, 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 337, 343, 355 A.2d 853, 856 (1976).
150. Nevertheless, "good faith," in the technical, collective bargaining sense of that term,
is not required. A "meet and discuss" obligation, although intended to promote an orderly
and constructive relationship and to serve as a means of solving labor problems, was not in-
tended to be a means for renegotiating, compromising, or amending existing collective bar-
gaining agreements. Id.
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
152. Id. § 1101.1201(a).
153. Id. § 1101.1201(b).
154. Id. § 1101.1301. Hollinger v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 469 Pa. 358, 366, 365
A.2d 1245, 1249 (1976). Cf. Parents Union for Pub. Schools v. Board of Educ., 480 Pa. 194,
198, 389 A.2d 577, 579 (1978) (PLRB does not have to pass upon all complaints of violations of
PERA; here conduct was not arguably an unfair labor practice).
The Commonwealth Court also held that the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve unfair labor
ractices under Act I I is in the PLRB. Geriot v. Borough of Darby, 38 Pa. Commw. Ct. 337,
94 A.2d 1298 (1978).
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1l01.1201(a)(5) and § l101.1201(b)(3).
156. See, e.g., Community Mental Health Center of Beaver County, 8 P.P.E.R. 114, 115
(PLRB 1977).
ing agreement, such as labor arbitration.'57 The demanded data,
however, must have some relation to negotiations or grievance han-
dling, "'58 and no duty exists to interpret or analyze the informa-
tion. 59
Closely related to the employer's duty to provide information
necessary for negotiating or administering a labor agreement is its
obligation to inform the union of its intent to, for example, subcon-
tract bargaining unit work, or take any other action that must be
bargained before being implemented. An important distinction is
that a union must demand information necessary for negotiating or
administering a labor agreement. The employer must on its own in-
form the union that it is considering a course of action that requires
bargaining. 6 ° Nevertheless, when the union has actual knowledge
of the employer's intent, for example, to subcontract, the union must
enforce its right to collectively bargain immediately. That is, the
union must protect its interest by attempting to bargain because if it
waits until the subcontract is awarded and then files a refusal to bar-
gain charge, it waives the right to bargain.'
2. Unilateral Changes.-Another common variant of a refusal
to bargain is the unilateral discontinuance of benefits or other unilat-
eral changes in wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employ-
ment. 62 Such unilateral action creates afait accompli, and precludes
bargaining on the subject.
Yet, not every change in working conditions need be bar-
gained.' 63 The collective bargaining agreement between the parties
157. See Bethel Park School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 174 (PLRB 1973); City of Williamsport, 2
P.P.E.R. 163, 165 (PLRB 1972).
158. Greater Greenburg Sewage Auth., 6 P.P.E.R. 37 (PLRB 1975).
159. Bellefonte School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 26 (PLRB 1973).
160. See, e.g., Sto-Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 9065 (PLRB 1978).
161. See Garnet Valley School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 365 (PLRB 1977).
162. Various unilateral changes constitute a refusal to bargain. See, e.g., PLRB v. Mars
Area School Dist., 480 Pa. 295, 389 A.2d 1073 (1978) (replacement of paid substitute teachers
with unpaid volunteers); Norristown Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. $ 9096 (PLRB 1978) (fur-
lough or lay off of employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and employer must bargain
to impasse before taking unilateral action); Clarion County Comm'rs, 8 P.P.E.R. 107 (PLRB
1977) (discontinuing observance of two holidays); Upper St. Clair School Dist., 5 P.P.E.R. 96
(PLRB 1974) (discontinuing one run of school bus service); Lawrence Housing Auth., 5
P.P.E.R. 39 (PLRB 1974) (employer announcement of strict adherence to rules after union
selected when strict adherence deviated from past practice); Highland Sewer and Water Auth.,
4 P.P.E.R. 116 (PLRB 1974) (unilateral wage increase during negotiations); Allegheny Twp., 3
P.P.E.R. 322 (PLRB 1973) (change in method of payment for "no work" days); Borough of
Berwick, 3 P.P.E.R. 183 (PLRB 1973) (unilateral elimination of bonus).
163. See PLRB v. AFSCME, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 371, 348 A.2d 921 (1975). A unilateral
transfer of employees was not a refusal to bargain when the employer offered to meet and
discuss regarding the reassignment and the transfer was a matter of inherent managerial au-
thority. County of Northampton, 10 P.P.E.R. 1 10010 (PLRB 1978).
When employees go on strike, their right to salary and benefits terminate, and discontinu-
ance of these by the employer is permissible. Hazleton Area Bd. of School Dir., 7 P.P.E.R. 234
(PLRB 1976). When employees are not on strike and the collective bargaining agreement
might provide for unilateral control by the public employer over cer-
tain specific aspects of employment. A collective bargaining agree-
ment provision can provide a basis for concluding that the employer
fulfilled its obligation to bargain on that subject.' The agreement
might also contain a "waiver and integration" clause that indirectly
fulfills the obligation to bargain.' 6  Although this is a troublesome
area, the PLRB currently gives more credence to such provisions as
evidenced by recent cases in which public employers unilaterally im-
posed residency requirements and smoking bans.
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3. Subcontracting.-Recently, the PLRB found a duty to bar-
gain over the subcontracting of work fulfilled by a waiver and inte-
gration clause. 67 Whether the decision to subcontract is a matter of
bargaining or of "meet and discuss" depends on whether the issue of
subcontracting is a matter of inherent managerial policy, 68 a deter-
mination that must be made through application of the balancing
test of PLRB v. State College Area School District.
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4. "Surface" vs. "'Hard" Bargaining.-A number of refusal to
expires, however, the employer must maintain existing terms and conditions of employment.
PLRB v. Cumberland County School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978).
164. If the union claims a unilateral change in a matter governed by a provision of the
collective bargaining agreement, arguably, an arbitrator, and not the PLRB, should resolve the
dispute. Cf. Cowden, Deferral to Arbitration by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 80
DICK. L. REV. 666 (1976) (PERA does not permit the PLRB to decline jurisdiction in the first
instance in favor of arbitration). Nothing in PERA requires the PLRB to stay unfair labor
practice proceedings pending the outcome of grievance arbitration on the same issues. PLRB
v. General Braddock Area School Dist., 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 55, 63, 380 A.2d 946, 950 (1977).
165. See, e.g., Keystone School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9058 (PLRB 1978); Bucks County Area
Vocational-Tech. School, 6 P.P.E.R. 230 (PLRB 1975).
166. The unilateral imposition of residency requirements by public employers is a refusal
to bargain. Ambridge Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9034 (PLRB 1978); Erie School District,
9 P.P.E.R. 9031 (PLRB 1978). Nevertheless, a public employer's unilateral imposition of a
residency requirement is not an unfair practice when a collective bargaining agreement with a
broad waiver and integration clause waiving bargaining on all matters, irrespective of whether
or not they were bargained, mentioned, or discussed, is in effect. Keystone School Dist., 9
P.P.E.R. 9058 (PLRB 1978); City of Reading, 9 P.P.E.R. 9293 (PLRB 1978). For a general
discussion of residency requirements, see Hayford & Durkee, Residency Requirements in Local
Government Employment: The Impact of the Public Employers Duty to Bargain, 29 LAB. L.J.
649 (1978).
The unilateral imposition of bans on smoking by public employers also engendered a
number of refusal to bargain cases. Again the PLRB ruled that the impact on the employees'
working conditions outweighed the effect of bargaining on the employer's basic policy, thus
concluding that such bans were a mandatory subject of bargaining. Nevertheless, the PLRB
ruled that the employers indirectly fulfilled their duty to bargain through the broad waiver and
integration clauses in the collective bargaining agreements. Venango County Bd. of Assist., 10
P.P.E.R. 10013 (PLRB 1978); Chambersburg Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9080 (PLRB
1978); Waynesboro Area Bd. of School Dir., 9 P.P.E.R. 9066 (PLRB 1978).
167. Harrisburg School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R. 110116 (PLRB 1979). Compare PLRB v. Mars
Area School Dist., 480 Pa. 295, 389 A.2d 1073 (1978); PLRB v. Employees' Comm., Wilkins-
burg Sanit. Dep't, 463 Pa. 521, 345 A.2d 641 (1975).
168. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
169. 461 Pa. 504, 506, 337 A.2d 266, 267 (1975). PLRB v. Mars Area School Dist., 480 Pa.
295, 299, 389 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1978) (replacement of paid teacher-aides with unpaid volun-
teers).
bargain cases arise out of conduct falling short of an outright refusal
to discuss specific subjects.' 70 One recurring problem comes about
when the public employer sits down at the bargaining table without
the slightest intention of reaching any agreement with the union.
A distinction must be made between unlawful "surface" bar-
gaining, which occurs when the employer goes through the motions
of bargaining, but makes it obvious that it will be impossible to
reach any agreement,' 71 and "hard" bargaining, which occurs when
the employer or union insists on certain bargainable matters being
included in or excluded from the agreement, and refuses to budge
from its position. 72 The former practice is unlawful because one
party is not attempting to discharge its obligation to bargain in good
faith. The law does not require either side to make concessions, or
agree to specific proposals, 73 but there must be some movement in
the negotiations evincing an attempt to reach some middle
ground. 
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It is a separate and distinct unfair practice to refuse to reduce a
collective bargaining agreement to writing, once an agreement is
reached.175 This unfair practice is closely related to a refusal to bar-
gain, and a violation turns on the finding of whether an agreement
was actually reached by the parties.
176
B. Interference With Bargaining Representatives
1. Domination of Unions.-Employer domination of or inter-
ference with the formation, existence, or administration of an em-
ployee representative organization is an unfair labor practice.
77
170. See, e.g., Phoenixville Area School Bd., 4 P.P.E.R. 50 (PLRB 1974) (unjustified and
prolonged delay); Bethlehem Area School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 102 (PLRB 1973) (insistence on
bargaining "in the sunshine").
A refusal to bargain charge can also arise out of an employer's refusal to allow union
representation at disciplinary meetings. Compare Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 5 P.P.E.R.
80 (PLRB 1974) (no grievance being discussed) with Warwick Bd. of School Dir., 4 P.P.E.R.
146 (PLRB 1974) (grievance discussed with individual without union representative present).
The existence of a right to union representation during disciplinary meetings is discussed in
Decker, Public Sector Union Representation Rights at Investigatory Inverviews in Pennsylvania,
82 DICK. L. REV. 655, 662-670 (1978).
171. The observation of Professor Cox that "[a]s long as there are unions weak enough to
be talked to death there will be employers who are tempted to engage in the forms of bargain-
ing without the substance," is equally applicable to the public sector. Cox, The Duty to Bargain
in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1413 (1958).
172. See, e.g., NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978).
173. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
174. "[Rlefusal to compromise as to one part of a collective bargaining proposal where
concessions have been made on other aspects of the agreement is not a per se violation of
Section 1201(a)(5) of the act." PLRB v. Commonwealth, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 145, 148, 367
A.2d 805, 807 (1977). See also Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit # 16, 9 P.P.E.R.
9001 (PLRB 1977).
175. This is an unfair labor practice for both employers and unions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 1101.1201(a)(6) and § ll01.1201(b)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
176. See, e.g., Luzerne County Community College, 8 P.P.E.R. 113 (PLRB 1977).
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
Prohibiting this activity prevents the derogation of employee rights
that would occur if the employer controlled the union. Although
some cases dealing with allegations of employer domination of the
union exist,'78 the majority of them contained charges of employer
domination when other unfair practice charges were more appo-
site.' 79 The PLRB properly found a violation when a school district
gave financial support, albeit minor, to an affiliate of a labor organi-
zation that was contending for recognition with another union.
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2. Coercing the Employer's Selection of a Bargaining Represen-
tative.-Similar to the prohibition on employer domination of un-
ions is PERA's prohibition of employees or their representative
organizations restraining or coercing the employer in the selection of
its bargaining representative. '8' The prohibition seeks to prevent ef-
forts by a union to force an employer to pick a bargaining represen-
tative receptive to the union's demands. No cases exist construing
this section of PERA.
C Discrimination and Interference With Employees' Rights
Employees are guaranteed freedom to exercise or refrain from
exercising the rights granted under PERA. 82 Therefore, mecha-
nisms protecting against interference with these rights are necessary,
and they must protect against both employer 83 and union interfer-
ence.
1. Discrimination and Interference by the Employer.-It is clear
that an employer cannot discharge or threaten an employee for en-
gaging in union activity, 84 but not all union activity is protected.
178. See, e.g., Interboro School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 125 (PLRB 1973); Bensalem Twp. School
Dist., 2 P.P.E.R. 12 (PLRB 1972).
179. See, e.g., Upper St. Clair School Dist., 5 P.P.E.R. 96 (PLRB 1974); Elizabethtown
School Bd., 5 P.P.E.R. 31 (PLRB 1974). Often unfair labor practice complaints against em-
ployers include charges of union domination as a catchall provision. Duquesne City School
Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 351, 353 (PLRB 1973). It should be noted that although bypassing a union
and communicating directly to employees about the course of collective bargaining is not dom-
ination of a union, Portage Area School Dist., 4 P.P.E.R. 23 (PLRB 1974), it may be an unlaw-
ful refusal to bargain. See North Bedford School Dist., 7 P.P.E.R. 194 (PLRB 1976). But cf.
Williamsport Educ. Ass'n, 6 P.P.E.R. 57, 59 (PLRB 1975); Baldwin-Whitehall School Dist., 2
P.P.E.R. 165 (PLRB 1972) (suggesting that when the facts are not misrepresented and the
communication is not coercive, there is no refusal to bargain).
180. Allentown School Dist., 1 P.P.E.R. 8 (PLRB 1971).
181. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
182. Id. § II01A01.
183. An employer is responsible for the unfair labor practices of its supervisors. Du-
quesne School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 351 (PLRB 1973). Thus, an anomaly results under PERA-
first level supervisors can both subject an employer to liability for unfair labor practices and
initiate the organization of rank-and-file employees. See Bethel Park School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R.
2 (PLRB 1976). Of course, first level supervisors are not placed in rank-and-file units. See
notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra. Nonetheless, the potential for a conflict of interest
remains.
184. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a)(l) and (3) (Purdon Supp. 1979). This proscrip-
An employee receives no protection from PERA for engaging in un-
lawful union activity.1
85
Moreover, the employee or union charging unlawful interfer-
ence or discrimination must prove certain essential elements.
Knowledge of the employee's union activity is one element. 86 An-
other element is "antiunion animus," which is a willingness on the
employer's part to act unlawfully toward that employee, 87 and
which is analogous to specific intent in criminal law. Antiunion ani-
mus must be more than a general dislike of unions by the em-
ployer. 188 It can be established, however, by disparate treatment of
an active union member,'89 or inferred from the fact that an em-
ployee is discriminated against shortly after the union activity comes
to the attention of the employer. t9° The passage of a significant
amount of time between the union activism allegedly motivating the
discrimination and the employer's allegedly discriminatory conduct
tends to rebut allegations of antiunion animus, t9t as does a showing
that other union members were promoted or otherwise treated favor-
ably by the employer.'92
Surveillance or interrogation of employees for the purpose of
learning of union activities likewise is an unfair labor practice.
93
Again, the purpose of the prohibition is to prevent employees from
being coerced in the exercise of their rights under PERA. Therefore,
employer surveillance should be unlawful only when related, or po-
tentially related, to union activities.' 94
tion extends to any conduct intended to discourage employees from exercising their rights
under PERA. See, e.g., Schuylkill County, 6 P.P.E.R. 15 (PLRB 1975) (forced transfers
and/or resignation); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 5 P.P.E.R. 100 (PLRB 1974) (failure to
promote); Cornwall-Lebanon School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 49 (PLRB 1973) (changes in work
schedules).
185. PLRB v. Pleasant Valley School Dist., 66 D.&C.2d 637 (C.P. Monroe 1974).
186. See Shive v. Bellefonte Area Bd. of School Dir., 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 543, 317 A.2d
311 (1974); Westmoreland County Community College, 3 P.P.E.R. 311 (PLRB 1973).
187. See PLRB v. Ficon, Inc., 434 Pa. 383, 388, 254 A.2d 3 (1969).
188. See Montefiore Hosp., 5 P.P.E.R. 98 (PLRB 1974).
189. See, e.g., Penn Twp., 6 P.P.E.R. 187 (PLRB 1975); Charles Cole Mem. Hosp., 3
P.P.E.R. 286 (PLRB 1973).
190. See, e.g., Philipsburg Borough, 7 P.P.E.R. 299 (PLRB 1976) (discharge two weeks
after representation petition filed); Luzerne County, 3 P.P.E.R. 204 (PLRB 1973) (discharge
two days after union meeting).
191. See, e.g., Lower Bucks Hosp., 6 P.P.E.R. 142 (PLRB 1975); Barnes-Kasson Hosp., 4
P.P.E.R. 48 (PLRB 1974).
192. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 6 P.P.E.R. 38 (PLRB 1975); Chartiers
Valley School Dist., 4 P.P.E.R. 90 (PLRB 1974).
193. See, e.g., General Braddock Area School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 99 (PLRB 1975) (bargain-
ing unit members at a meeting asked to rise to indicate union preference); Brownsville Area
School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 321 (PLRB 1973) (union grievance representative asked to report
which employees he was visiting). See also Lower Bucks Hosp., 6 P.P.E.R. 142, 143 (PLRB
1975) (PLRB standards regarding when interrogation is unlawful).
194. Otherwise, the employer could not observe its employees to determine whether they
are performing their jobs. But see Pennsylvania Game Comm'n, 7 P.P.E.R. 128 (PLRB 1976)
(antiunion motivation not a prerequisite).
2. Union Interference with Employee Rights.-PERA permits a
union to negotiate a significant restriction on employees' rights;
namely, a maintenance of membership clause in a collective bargain-
ing agreement.' This is, however, probably the least restrictive of
union security provisions because an employee is not compelled to
join a union as in "closed shop" or "union shop" situations, or con-
tribute financial support as in an "agency shop" situation. An em-
ployee need only maintain his membership in the union by paying
dues and assessments once the employee joins and becomes subject
to the maintenance of membership clause. Of course, failure to
maintain membership for any period other than the statutory "es-
cape period"' 96 may result in termination of employment.' 97
Unions cannot otherwise restrain or coerce employees in the ex-
ercise of rights granted employees under PERA, 98 but violations of
this section are uncommon.' 99 Disparate treatment on the basis of
nonmembership in the union should constitute a violation of this
section, which might arise when a union fails to arbitrate an em-
ployee's grievance. Such an abuse of discretion by the bargaining
representative is a breach of its duty of fair representation. 2°
D. Other Unfair Practices
1. Protection of PLRB Processes.-It is an unfair labor prac-
tice when an employer disciplines or otherwise discriminates against
an employee because the employee filed an affidavit, petition or
complaint with, or gave any information or testimony to or before
the PLRB.20 1 Apparently the PLRB extends this protection to utili-
zation of a collectively bargained grievance procedure.20 2 Violations
of this section are relatively rare.20 3
2. Boycotts.-PERA covers boycotts by unions in two unfair
195. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.705 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See also id. § 1101.301(18).
196. Id.
197. The PLRB finds no impropriety when employers terminate employees violating the
collective bargaining agreement by not paying dues and assessments. Philadelphia Housing
Auth., 3 P.P.E.R. 197 (PLRB 1973). The Commonwealth Court ruled, however, that school
teachers cannot be terminated for failure to pay dues. Dauphin County Tech. School Educ.
Ass'n v. Dauphin County Area Vocational Tech. School Bd., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 639, 357
A.2d 721 (1976), afd by an equally divided court, 483 Pa. 604, 398 A.2d 168 (1978).
198. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § l101.1201(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
199. The PLRB found a violation when a union threatened to fine an employee who val-
idly resigned from the union for going back to work during a strike. Pennsylvania Social Serv.
Union, 7 P.P.E.R. 266 and 7 P.P.E.R. 103 (PLRB 1976). See also City of Lebanon, 7 P.P.E.R.
244 (PLRB 1976); Baldwin-Whitehall School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 40 (PLRB 1973).
200. See Decker, Fair Representation and Pennsylvania Public Employee Labor Relations,
83 DICK. L. REV. 709 (1979).
201. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
202. Midland School Dist., 7 P.P.E.R. 317, 318 (PLRB 1976).
203. Representative cases are Plymouth Twp. Bd. of Comm'rs, 3 P.P.E.R. 315 (PLRB
1973); City of McKeesport, 3 P.P.E.R. 161 (PLRB 1973).
labor practice sections. The first prohibits a strike or boycott by a
union when the striking union is involved in a jurisdictional contro-
versy with another union.2' The second is a broad prohibition of
boycotts and a restriction on union attempts to compel recognition of
a union not certified by the PLRB.2 °5
3. Refusal to Comply with an Arbitration Award-PERA
makes a refusal to comply with an arbitration award a separate and
distinct unfair labor practice for both public employers and un-
ions. 2" In deciding whether the PLRB should consider the validity
of the award before enforcing it, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
PLRB v. Commonwealth,2" 7 ruled that the validity of the arbitrator's
award could not be collaterally attacked in a PLRB proceeding, and
held that the party against whom enforcement was sought must ap-
peal directly to the courts if it believed the award was invalid. 0 8
Thus, the PLRB's role is limited to determining whether a final
award of an arbitrator exists20 9 and whether the party implemented
the award. z 0
4. Unfair Labor Practices under Act 11.-Act I ll contains no
unfair labor practice sections.2 1 ' The PLRB, however, concluded
that Philadelphia Fire Officers Association v. PLRB2 12 authorized it to
incorporate the unfair labor practice sections of the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Act 213 into Act 1 l.214 In a somewhat anomalous
decision that purportedly applies, but apparently misconstrues, the
Philadelphia Fire Officers decision, the Commonwealth Court stated
that Philadelphia Fire Officers required that PERA and Act 11 1 be
read inpari materia2 1 5 and concluded that the unfair labor practice
provisions of PERA applied to Act 111.216 The PLRB approach is
the sounder of the two because PERA by its express language does
204. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(b)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
205. Id. § 1201(b)(7). The PLRB found violations of this section in Baldwin-Whitehall
School Dist., 3 P.P.E.R. 40 (PLRB 1973) and Beaver County Educ. Ass'n, I P.P.E.R. 68 (PLRB
1971).
206. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a)(8) and (b)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1979). A refusal
to comply with an arbitration award is not a refusal to bargain. Lancaster County vocational-
Tech. Attendance Area Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. $ 9091 (PLRB 1978).
207. 478 Pa. 582, 387 A.2d 475 (1978).
208. Id. at 588, 387 A.2d at 478.
209. That is, whether the 30 day time period for appealing the award under Pa. R.A.P.
1512(a)(1) ran out, or the award was upheld if an appeal was taken.
210. PLRB v. Commonwealth, 478 Pa. 582, 591, 387 A.2d 475, 479 (1978).
211. See Decker, The PLRB's New Jurisdiion for Police and Firemen, 16 DuQ. L. REV.
185, 197-98 (1978).
212. 470 Pa. 550, 369 A.2d 259 (1977).
213. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217. (Purdon Supp. 1979).
214. City of Easton, 9 P.P.E.R. 9019 (PLRB 1978).
215. Geriot v. Borough of Darby, 38 Pa. Commw. Ct. 337, 394 A.2d 1298, 1299 (1978).
216. Id. at 338, 394 A.2d at 1299.
not apply to policemen and firemen, who are covered by Act 111.217
This point is recognized in Philadelphia Fire Officers,218 but appar-
ently was overlooked by the Commonwealth Court. Suffice it to say,
in pari materia construction can cure legislative oversights, but
should never contradict legislative intent.219
V. Strikes
Perhaps the most dramatic change PERA effected in Penn-
sylvania's public employee law was the creation of a limited right to
strike. 22° The right to strike is limited by statutory provisions gov-
erning when a strike may occur.22' Moreover, PERA denies the
right to strike to guards at prisons and mental hospitals and employ-
ees directly involved with and necessary to the functioning of the
courts.222 Act 111 provides for collective bargaining and interest ar-
bitration for policemen and firemen, but implicitly forbids strikes by
these employees.
23
.4. Enjoining Strikes by Public Employees
PERA's prohibitions on strikes by policemen, firemen, guards at
prisons and mental institutions, and court related employees are rel-
atively clear. The prohibition of strikes that create a "clear and pres-
ent danger to the health, safety and welfare of the public" 224 poses a
more difficult determination for the courts, and engenders more liti-
gation.
Bristol Township Education Association v. School Directors
225
considered seventeen separate items 226 that the lower court relied on
217. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
218. 470 Pa. 550, 558, 369 A.2d 259, 262 (1977). The Commonwealth Court's decision
further complicates an already complicated area by requiring that three statutes rather than
two be read in pari materia. See also notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
219. See 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 51.01-.08 (4th ed.
1973).
220. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Before the enactment of
PERA, there was a broad and all inclusive prohibition on strikes by public employees. The
Public Employe Law, Act of June 30, 1947, Pub. L. 1183, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.2
(Purdon 1964). The right to strike afforded by PERA survived constitutional challenge in
Butler Area School Dist. v. Butler Area Educ. Ass'n, 481 Pa. 20, 391 A.2d 1295 (1978) (per
curiam). See generally, Decker, The Right to Strike for Pennsylvania'r Public Employees-Its
Scope, Limits and Ramifications for the Public Employer, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 755 (1979).
221. See notes 105-07 and accompanying text supra.
222. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
223. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.11 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Also, by failing to include
employees covered by Act Ill in its definition of public employee, PERA denies any right to
strike by policemen and firemen. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.301(2) (Purdon Supp.
1979).
224. Id. § 1101.1003.
225. 14 Pa. Commnw. Ct. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974).
226. These items included the deprivation of the student's education, the impossibility of
making up all the instructional days lost, the possibility of losing a state subsidy, the loss of
wages of nonstriking employees, the loss of special education classes, and the loss of free
lunches by indigent students. Id. at 468-69, 322 A.2d at 769-70.
in finding a clear and present danger. Nevertheless, the Common-
wealth Court noted that it could not "hold that any one of them
taken alone or considered together would necessarily constitute a ba-
sis for the injunction . *... 227 Basically, this is a recognition that
the propriety of enjoining a strike, in the absence of a showing of
manifest unreasonableness, is best left to the discretion of the lower
court,228 and that the formulation of a black letter rule regarding the
issuance of an injunction is impossible.
B. The 180 Day Rule
A major factor influencing the enjoining of strikes in school sys-
tems is the requirement that school districts provide 180 days of in-
struction for the students.229  Although this benefits the school
district because it can utilize this requirement to persuade courts to
enjoin strikes, the requirement also benefits striking teachers because
it assures them that they will work approximately the same number
of days in any given year regardless of whether or not they strike, a
wage guarantee that private sector strikes lack.
Because the 180 day rule governs whether a school district re-
ceives its full state subsidy, failure to prove a threatened loss of this
subsidy through an inability to make up the lost school days can
result in the denial of an injunction.23 ° When subsidies are not
threatened, the strike is at most an inconvenience, and the courts
recognize that in authorizing strikes by public employees the Legis-
lature "indicated its willingness to accept certain inconveniences. ''23'
In the final analysis, however, the 180 day rule is an inchoate limita-
tion on the length of school teacher strikes, albeit one counterbal-
anced by the political pressure exerted on the school district by the
community at large.
VI. Arbitration
In labor relations, two types of arbitration exist. One is griev-
ance or contract interpretation arbitration, which is when a third
party or parties resolve a dispute between the union and the em-
ployer regarding the proper interpretation or application of an ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement. The other is interest
227. Id. at 470, 322 A.2d at 770.
228. Id. at 467-68, 322 A.2d at 769.
229. The Public School Code of March 10, 1949, Pub. L. 30, as amended by the Act of
September 21, 1957, Pub. L. 925, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1501 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
230. Morris v. Pennsbury School Bd., 7 P.P.E.R. 302, 303 (C.P. Bucks 1976).
231. Armstrong School Dist. v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n, 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 378, 384, 291
A.2d 120, 124 (1972). See also Morris v. Pennsbury School Bd., 7 P.P.E.R. 302, 304 (C.P.
Bucks 1976).
arbitration, which is a process in which a third party or parties re-
solve impasses in collective bargaining.
A. Act 111 Interest Arbitration.
Act 1 11 requires that a panel of interest arbitrators resolve a
collective bargaining impasse between bargaining representatives of
policemen or firemen and their employer.232 The panel of arbitra-
tors, after hearing the positions of both parties, makes a binding rec-
ommendation regarding what contract terms are reasonable. That is,
the arbitrators write the collective bargaining agreement for the par-
ties when the parties fail to resolve their differences in mediation.
Interest arbitration is statutorily mandated by Act 111 as an alterna-
tive for a resort to a strike or lockout when a bargaining impasse
occurs.
B. Arbitration Under PERA
In contrast to Act 11, PERA does not require that the parties
utilize interest arbitration. Rather, it merely permits the parties vol-
untarily to submit a bargaining impasse to binding interest arbitra-
tion. 33 Section 903 of PERA, however, mandates grievance
arbitration for all "disputes or grievances arising out of the interpre-
tation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
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The Commonwealth Court construes this section as requiring that
all collective bargaining agreements contain a grievance and arbitra-
tion procedure.2 35 A more literal reading is that section 903 merely
requires that all grievances and disputes be arbitrated regardless of
whether the collective bargaining agreement spells out the proce-
dure.2 36 The PLRB holds that this section, which refers only to col-
lective bargaining agreements, makes an arbitration provision in a
"memorandum of understanding" between a public employer and a
first level supervisor bargaining unit, and arbitration awards under
such a provision, enforceable through PERA's unfair labor practice
237provisions.
232. See notes 112 and 113 and accompanying text supra.
233. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.804 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
234. Id. § 1101.903.
235. See PLRB v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 355, 360, 370 A.2d
1241, 1243 (1977), rev'don other grounds, - Pa. -, 406 A.2d 329 (1979).
236. PERA permits the parties to set out the grievance and arbitration procedure in the
collective bargaining agreement, but it does not require that they do so. Section 903(1), PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903(1) specifies the procedure for selecting an arbitrator when the
parties have not agreed. Of course, the failure to include a collectively bargained arbitration
procedure in a labor agreement precludes a party from raising issues of procedural arbi-
trability, such as untimeliness in filing a grievance or invoking arbitration.
237. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 9 P.P.E.R. 9076 (1978). This construction is open
to question because first level supervisors do not have the right to bargain collectively, only the
right to "meet and discuss" with the public employer. Moreover, it is not an unfair labor
practice to refuse to reduce to writing agreements reached in "meet and discuss" sessions be-
I. Refusing to Arbitrate.-Not every dispute or grievance is ar-
bitrable. A number of factors such as untimeliness in invoking arbi-
tration, the absence of a provision in the collective bargaining
agreement covering the dispute, or even the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement under which to arbitrate, as occurs when the
labor agreement expires, 238 can affect arbitrability. Nevertheless,
questions of procedural arbitrability, for example, whether or not a
party complied with the time limits for invoking arbitration, are
within the arbitrator's exclusive jurisdiction,239 and a party cannot
refuse to arbitrate such an issue.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized the strong policy
in favor of arbitration embodied in PERA2 ° and held that enjoining
or denying arbitration is not permissible unless it can "be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."24 ' Basically, if the
grievance arguably involves an interpretation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, judicial inquiry is limited to determining
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and whether the dispute
comes within the language of the arbitration clause.242 It is clear that
a party cannot defend a refusal to arbitrate by relying on a provision
of the collective bargaining agreement, even a provision stating that
the matter is not subject to arbitration, to argue that the grievance
does not arise out of the collective bargaining agreement.243
cause the final decision always rests with the public employer. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.301(17) and § 1101.704 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Seealso notes 145 and 146 and accompa-
nying text supra.
238. See PLRB v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 355, 370 A.2d 1241
(1977), rev'd, - Pa. -, 406 A.2d 329 (1979). Cf. Methacton School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R. 110029
(PLRB 1979) (grievances filed prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement
remain arbitrable). Arbitration during a contract hiatus period is discussed in Decker, Arbi-
trability Of Pub/ic Sector Grievances After Expiration of a Contract, 7 J. COLL. NEGOT. 287
(1978). Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confect. Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243,
rehearing denied, 430 U.S. 988 (1977), establishes the law regarding arbitration during a hiatus
period in the federal private sector.
239. Duquesne School Dist. v. Duquesne Educ. Ass'n, 475 Pa. 279, 380 A.2d 353 (1977).
See Western Beaver County School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R. 10035 (PLRB 1979); Methacton
School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R. 110029 (PLRB 1979) (to refusing to arbitrate on grounds of procedu-
ral nonarbitrability is an unfair labor practice). See also notes 245-48 and accompanying text
infra.
240. Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 3, 464 Pa. 92, 99, 346
A.2d 35, 39 (1975).
241. Lincoln Univ. v. Lincoln Univ. Chapt., Am. Ass'n of Univ. Prof., 467 Pa. 112, 119,
354 A.2d 576, 581-82 (1976). Basically this is a restatement of the federal standard for private
sector labor arbitration. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960).
242. See, e.g., Carmichaels Area School Dist. v. Carmichaels Area Educ. Ass'n, 37 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 142, 145, 389 A.2d 1203, 1205-06, (1978); North Star School Dist. v. PLRB, 35 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 429, 433, 386 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1978). These decisions rely on Lincoln Univ. v.
Lincoln Univ. Chapt., Am. Ass'n of Univ. Prof., 467 Pa. 112, 119, 354 A.2d 576, 580 (1976).
Actually, only the second inquiry is necessary. It is irrelevant whether there was an agreement
to arbitrate because PERA statutorily requires arbitration of all disputes under a collective
bargaining agreement. See notes 235 and 236 and accompanying text supra.
243. See, e.g., Trinity Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 1 9071 (PLRB 1978). The Board ruled
2. Compelling Arbitration.-The question regarding who
should direct parties to go to arbitration when one of them refuses to
arbitrate poses difficult problems. In federal private sector labor re-
lations, a court is the proper forum for compelling a party to comply
with its promise to arbitrate.2" Whether a court or the PLRB is the
proper forum for compelling arbitration under PERA remains un-
clear.
The PLRB announced that it regarded the refusal of any party
to arbitrate as a refusal to bargain in West Me1in Area School Dis-
trict,245 and consistently followed this position in subsequent cases,
equating the arbitration procedure with the grievance procedure.246
When that position was challenged in the Commonwealth Court,
that court rejected the argument that the PLRB could not order arbi-
tration under the refusal to bargain theory.
247
The difficulty with this approach is that it requires a ruling that
the PLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases in which there is a
refusal to arbitrate. 248 This is not, however, in accord with the ap-
proach taken by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court because that court
accepted for review appeals concerning refusals to arbitrate that
arose in the judicial system.249 Moreover, the court also ruled that
mandamus was a proper means for compelling arbitration °.2 5  Be-
cause mandamus is proper only when no other legal remedy is avail-
able,251 'arguably, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not
that the grievance arose out of the collective bargaining agreement even though that agreement
incorporated a statute governing the grievance.
244. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
245. 5 P.P.E.R. 41 (PLRB 1974), rev'dinpar and mod#fed, 6 P.P.E.R. 139 (PLRB 1975).
246. See, e.g., Plum Borough Area School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R. 1 10001 (PLRB 1978); Bristol
Twp. School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 94 (PLRB 1977); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 7 P.P.E.R. 32
(PLRB 1976). Section 1201(a)(5) of PERA provides that for public employers a refusal to
bargain in good faith includes but is "not limited to the discussing of grievances with the
exclusive representative." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101. 1201(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1979). Ap-
parently the PLRB and the Commonwealth Court construe the discussing of grievances as
including the arbitration of grievances. Arguably, the discussion of grievances refers to
prearbitration negotiation and procedure, arbitration of the dispute being a mutual recognition
of an inability to achieve a collectively bargained result that requires an impartial third party
to resolve the impasse. This explanation is theoretically consistent with Act II1 interest arbi-
tration.
247. APSCUF v. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 403, 409, 373 A.2d 1175, 1178-179
(1977).
248. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1301 (Purdon Supp. 1979). The Commonwealth
Court, with the notable exception of Judge Mencer, heartily endorses this conclusion. See,
e.g., Koch v. Bellefonte Area School Dist., 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. 438, 441, 388 A.2d 1114, i115
(1978); North Star School Dist. v. PLRB, 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 429, 433, 386 A.2d 1059, 1061
(1978); Penn Hills School Dist. v. Penn Hills Educ. Ass'n, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 507, 511, 383
A.2d 1301, 1303 (1978).
249. See, e.g., Milberry v. Board of Educ., 467 Pa. 79, 354 A.2d 559 (1976).
250. "We believe that mandamus was the proper remedy to compel appellee to submit the
dispute to arbitration .... " Rylke v. Portage Area School Dist., 473 Pa. 481, 491, 375 A.2d
692, 697 (1977), rev'g, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 158, 341 A.2d 233 (1975).
251. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court fully recognized this point. 473 Pa. at 490, 375
A.2d at 696.
subscribe to either the PLRB's view that a refusal to arbitrate is a
refusal to bargain or the Commonwealth Court's rulings that exclu-
sive jurisdiction for compelling arbitration is in the PLRB.
A further complication is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
holding that PERA does not repeal the Arbitration Act of 1927252
except when a clear inconsistency exists between the two acts.253 Be-
cause the Arbitration Act of 1927 provides for judicial compulsion of
arbitration 25 4 and PERA is silent on how to compel arbitration, the
former should govern, which in turn means that a judicial forum is
the proper one for compelling arbitration. This appears to be the
most consistent and reasonable resolution of the problem. Neverthe-
less, it requires at least a sub silentio overruling of the mandamus
theory that the court previously endorsed. This is not a great loss,
however, because the Commonwealth Court never followed that
precedent.255
The present state of the law under PERA is unfortunate for rea-
sons other than its inconsistency. Because a public employer's argu-
ment that an unfavorable arbitral award could not be legally
complied with is not allowed on the ground that it must be appealed
under the Arbitration Act of 1927,256 the unfair labor practice theory
of the PLRB and the Commonwealth Court requires a multiplicity
of litigation. The public employer must first arbitrate and then liti-
gate on appeal if the award is unfavorable. It is both anomalous and
an inefficient use of public funds to require both arbitration and a
subsequent judicial proceeding when the latter alone might suffice in
disposing of the claim. The policy of favoring arbitration does not
require the arbitration of otherwise nonarbitrable claims, which arise
when the issue is whether a school district must meet the 180 day
requirement.257
Under the present state of the law, a public employer must seek
to enjoin arbitration in order to obtain a judicial forum for determin-
ing the arbitrability of the dispute because a refusal to arbitrate guar-
antees a PLRB finding of a refusal to bargain and a PLRB order to
arbitrate. In federal private sector labor law, questions of arbi-
252. Act of April 25, 1927, Pub. L. 381, No. 248, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 161-181 (Purdon
Supp. 1979).
253. Community College v. Community College, Soc'y of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 595-
96, 375 A.2d 1267, 1272 (1977).
254. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 163 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
255. See, e.g., Oxford Bd. of School Dir. v. PLRB, 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 441, 376 A.2d 1012
(1977). See also notes 247, 248 and accompanying text supra. But see North Star School Dist.
v. PLRB, 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 429, 436, 386 A.2d 1059, 1062 (1978) (Mencer, J., concurring)
(courts rather than the PLRB should determine arbitrability).
256. See North Star School Dist. v. PLRB, 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 429, 436, 386 A.2d 1059,
1062 (1978).
257. Id See also notes 229, 230 and accompanying text supra.
trability are always for the courts to pass on in the first instance.258
The result would be the same under PERA if the Arbitration Act of
1927 is held to provide the proper and exclusive means of compelling
arbitration.259 It is hoped that future Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decisions bring some consistency and guidance to this very muddled
area.
C. Judicial Review of Arbitration A wards
Both interest arbitration awards under Act 111 and grievance
arbitration awards under PERA are appealable. This is an area of
public sector labor law in which a voluminous amount of litigation
occurs. As with other areas of PERA and Act 111, the litigation fre-
quently raises more questions than it resolves.
L Petitioning for Review.-Unlike the standard of review ap-
plied on appeal of arbitrators' awards, the same procedural rules
govern both interest arbitration under Act 111 and grievance arbitra-
tion under PERA. When the appeal is of an arbitration involving a
local public employer, the appeal is taken to the court of common
pleas of that county.26 ° When the Commonwealth is the employer,
the appeal is to the Commonwealth Court.2 6' An appeal must be
taken within thirty days "after the date of the award of the arbitra-
tors" 262 in the case of an appeal to the common pleas court, and
"within thirty days after the entry of the order" 263 in the case of an
appeal to the Commonwealth Court. Although the Commonwealth
Court did not squarely face the issue, apparently it considers the date
on the arbitrator's award as being the date of entry of the order.2 4
Because of its potential value in quashing untimely appeals from ar-
bitration awards, the parties should direct an arbitrator to date the
opinion and the award before mailing it.
It is clear that either the employer or the union can take an ap-
peal. The question arises, however, whether an individual employee
has standing to appeal an arbitration award. In McCluskey v. Com-
258. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The NLRB does
not deem a refusal to arbitrate a refusal to bargain. See, e.g., Sucesion Mario Mercado &
Hijos, 161 NLRB 696, 700 (1966); Central Pub. Serv. Co., 139 NLRB 1407, 1418 (1962); Tex-
tron Puerto Rico, 107 N.L.R.B. 583, 584 (1953). See also note 244 and accompanying text
supra.
259. The PLRB rejected this position in Abington Heights School Dist., 10 P.P.E.R.
10007 (PLRB 1978). No courts have addressed the issue as of yet.
260. PA. R. Civ. P. 247(a). An appeal from the common pleas court's order is taken to the
Commonwealth Court. Id. 247(b).
261. PA. R.A.P. 703.
262. PA. R. Civ. P. 247(a).
263. Pa. R.A.P. 1512(a)(1).
264. See County of Dauphin v. PSSU, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 456, 459, 375 A.2d 1353, 1354-
355, vacated on other grounds, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 456, 382 A.2d 999 (1978). See also Ozolins
v. Department of Educ., 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 70, 73, 372 A.2d 1230, 1231 (1977).
monwealth265 Judge Blatt reasoned that when the union reserves ex-
clusive control over access to arbitration under the collective
bargaining agreement, only the parties-signatory to the labor agree-
ments-the employer or the union--can take an appeal.266
2. The Scope of Review Under PER4.-PERA does not provide a
statutory standard of review for arbitration awards. When faced
with the issue of what standard of review to apply, the Common-
wealth Court adopted the federal private sector "essence" test 267 an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp.,268 and refined by the Third Circuit in Ludwig
Honold Manufacturing Co. 2 69 The Third Circuit held,
An arbitrator's award draws its essence from the collective bar-
gaining agreement if the interpretation can in any rational way be
derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its
context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention; only where
there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported
by the principles of contract construction and the law of the shop,
may a reviewing court disturb the award.27°
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently ruled, in Com-
munity College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver
County, Society of the Faculty,27" ' that the Arbitration Act of 1927272
governs the appeal of arbitration awards under PERA, but reasoned
that the scope of review under the Act of 1927 and the "essence" test
were conterminous. 273 Therefore, the test can be generally stated as
whether the arbitrator's award can in any rational way be derived
from the collective bargaining agreement.274
The truly significant holding of Beaver County is that the arbi-
trator is making a factual determination whenever the arbitrator
construes a provision of the collective bargaining agreement.275 This
has important implications for the judicial review of public sector
labor arbitration awards because once the arbitrator construes or ap-
plies a law, rather than an express term of the labor agreement, the
award may be modified for error of law under the Arbitration Act of
1927. That Act permits modification of an award when "the award
265. 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 598, 391 A.2d 45 (1978). See also Gardocki v. Commonwealth,
42 Pa. Commw. Ct. 579, 401 A.2d 410 (1979).
266. 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 603, 391 A.2d at 48.
267. Teamsters, Local 77 v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 238, 331
A.2d 588 (1975).
268. 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
269. 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
270. Id. at 1128.
271. 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977). For an extended analysis of this decision see
Comment, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1977, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 550, 715-26 (1978).
272. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 161-181 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
273. 473 Pa. at 589-90, 375 A.2d at 1273.
274. Id. at 594, 375 A.2d at 1275-276.
275. Id. at 593, 375 A.2d at 1275.
is against the law, and is such that had it been a verdict of the jury
the court would have entered different or other judgment notwith-
standing the verdict.
276
This is a healthy development because it authorizes modifica-
tion of the award for error of law. Legal scholars maintain that the
same result will, or should, obtain under an application of the "es-
sence" test,277 but it is reassuring to see a judicial affirmation of the
principle that courts are the ultimate arbiters of social policy, espe-
cially in the context of public sector labor arbitration when arbitra-
tion is required by statute rather than consensually agreed upon.278
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized in
Leechburg Area School District v. Leechburg Education Associa-
tion 2 7 that different sections of the Arbitration Act govern the scope
of review when a party seeks to vacate rather than modify an
award.28 ° Therefore, the ground for the appeal under the Arbitra-
tion Act of 1927 controls the ultimate disposition, and an appealing
party risks affirmance of the award unless they specifically ground
the basis for their appeal in the language of the Arbitration Act, de-
spite the language in Beaver County suggesting that the Arbitration
Act sets forth the same standard of review as the "essence" test.28'
The result of an application of the Arbitration Act, however, is
no more predictable than the result under an application of the "es-
sence" test. Perhaps the only significant difference between the two
is that the former presents a slightly more difficult procedural hurdle
in requiring the specification of the relief sought on appeal. That is,
the balance struck in favor of the finality of arbitral awards by the
"essence" test remains unaltered. On the other hand, it may require
a "modification" of arbitral awards that, in effect, are reversals of the
arbitrator. 282  An example of the latter is when the arbitrator's
award, which would stand unaltered under the "essence" test, is
"modified" and effectively reversed because it is based solely on
hearsay evidence.283 In sum, it might require a broader standard of
276. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 170(d) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
277. See Feller, Arbitration: The Days of Its Glory Are Numbered, 2 INDUs. REL. L.J. 97
(1977); St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards.- A4 Second Look at Enterprise
*heel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
278. See Comment, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Under Pennsylvania's
Public Employe Relations Act, 83 DICK. L. REv. 795 (1979).
279. 475 Pa. 413, 380 A.2d 1203 (1977).
280. Id. at 417, 380 A.2d at 1204. The majority in Leechburg reasoned that there was no
ground for reviewing the award because the appellant stated no basis for vacating the award
under the Arbitration Act of 1927. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 170 (vacation of an arbitrator's
award) and § 171 (modification of an arbitrator's award) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
281. See Community College v. Community College, Soc'y of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576,
598, 375 A.2d 1267, 1277 (1977). See also Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Leechburg Educ.
Ass'n, 475 Pa. 413, 426, 380 A.2d 1203, 1207-1208 (Pomeroy J., concurring).
282. Scholastic Tech. Serv. Employees, Local 8 v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 37 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 622, 626, 391 A.2d 1097, 1099 (1978).
283. The Commonwealth Court previously ruled that it would not set aside an arbitrator's
review than that afforded by the essence test despite the statement by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the "essence" test and Arbitra-
tion Act standards were the same.
284
3. The Scope of Review Under Act 11.-The award of an arbi-
tration panel under Act I ll is final on the issue or issues in dispute;
the Act specifically states that no appeal will be allowed to any
court.2 85 Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed re-
view of Act 111 arbitrations in the nature of a narrow certiorari, 86
and the awards are appealable on the ground that the public em-
ployer cannot lawfully carry out the award.2 87 The lawfulness of the
award must be contested through an appeal rather than through re-
fusing to comply with the award and raising the issue of lawfulness
in a mandamus action brought to compel compliance with the
award.288
D. Injunctions Pending Arbitration
Increasingly, public employees and public employee unions at-
tempt to enjoin actions by public employers pending arbitration on
the issue of whether the course of action contemplated by the public
employer violates the collective bargaining agreement. Most fre-
quently, injuctions are sought in situations when a strike by the em-
ployees would be ineffective; namely, in the case of layoffs or
terminations. 289 The increase in the numbers of this type of action in
the public sector parallels the development and increasing use of this
type of suit in the private sector. The propriety of enjoining employ-
ers pending arbitration is a popular topic among commentators.29 °
award even if the arbitrator based his award on hearsay evidence. United Transp. Union,
Local 1594 v. SEPTA, Red Arrow Div., 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 323, 368 A.2d 834 (1977); Allen-
town School Dist. v. Allentown Educ. Ass'n, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 224, 351 A.2d 292 (1976).
This is in accord with the federal private sector approach. See United Instrument Workers,
Local 116 v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., 54 L.R.R.M. 2660, 2661 (E.D. Pa. 1963). Whether
the Commonwealth Court's decisions survive under the judgment n.o.v. standard mandated in
Community College v. Community College, Soc'y of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267
(1977) is unsettled.
284. Community College v. Community College, Soc'y of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 589-
90, 375 A.2d 1267, 1273 (1977).
285. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.7(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
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287. See notes 135 and 136 and accompanying text supra. PA. R. Civ. P. 247 governs the
review of awards when a local governmental unit is the employer. PA. R.A.P. 703 governs the
review when the Commonwealth is the employer. See also the Judicial Code of July 9, 1976,
Pub. L. 586, No. 142, as amended by the Act of April 28, 1978, Pub. L. 202, No. 53, 42 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 763 and § 933 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
288. Polarkoff v. Town Council of Aliquippa, 39 Pa. Commw. Ct. 604, 606, 396 A.2d 75,
77 (1979).
289. See notes 291, 293, and 295 infra.
290. See Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbirtration Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30
STAN. L. REV. 533 (1978); Payne, Enjoining Employers Pending Arbitration - From M-K-Tto
Greyhound and Beyond, 3 INDUS. REL. L. J. 169 (1979); Simon, Injunctive Relief to Maintain the
Status Quo Pending Arbitration" A Union Practitioner's View, 29th Ann. N.Y.U. CONF. LAB.
In New York, actions to enjoin public employers pending arbi-
tration meet with little success because of a stringent application of
the irreparable injury requirement by the courts of that state.29' One
commentator argues that the focus of the irreparable injury inquiry
should be on the effect of the employer's actions on the arbitration
process, 292 which appears to be the majority view in the federal pri-
vate sector labor law.29 The New York public sector cases view ar-
bitration as an adequate remedy at law.29 4 In Pennsylvania's public
sector labor relations law the cases are mixed. 295 Recent Common-
wealth Court cases suggest, however, that the Commonwealth Court
will focus on how the public employer's proposed course of action
will affect arbitration on the ground that premature judicial inter-
vention to preserve the status quo might usurp the arbitrator's reme-
dial powers.296
VII. Conclusion
PERA, the public sector collective bargaining statute that covers
the majority of Pennsylvania's public sector employees, resembles
the federal statute governing private sector labor relations. Never-
theless, the court and PLRB decisions recognize that significant dif-
ferences exist between public and private sector labor relations law.
As the second decade of public sector bargaining dawns in Penn-
sylvania, it is clear that federal private sector law does not always
provide a pat answer to the somewhat perplexing questions that arise
in the context of public sector labor relations. This article pointed
out a number of anomalies and inconsistencies that presently exist in
the Pennsylvania law as applied and construed by the courts and the
PLRB. These evolutionary growth pangs are to be expected. The
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1976); Transit Union, Division 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 127 (1977).
294. See note 291 supra.
295. See Joint Bargaining Comm. v. Commonwealth, 1421 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Aug. 19, 1977) (order denying preliminary injunction); Council 13, AFSCME v. Shapp, 1508
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critical analysis in this article was made in the belief that a recogni-
tion of problem areas is a necessary first step toward resolving them.
Although this article is far from being comprehensive, it is hoped
that it will assist in adding logic and consistency to the inevitable
further developments in Pennsylvania's public sector collective bar-
gaining laws. It is also hoped that it will provide a useful basic refer-
ence and starting point for practitioners in this specialized and fairly
complicated area of Pennsylvania law.
JOHN D. THRUSH

